Biological weapons attribution a primer by Stone Bahr, Elizabeth L.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2007-06
Biological weapons attribution a primer
Stone Bahr, Elizabeth L.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
 









 Thesis Co-Advisors:   Peter R. Lavoy 
  Anne Clunan 
 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for 
reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis 
Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) 
Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
June 2007 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   Biological Weapons Attribution: A Primer 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Elizabeth Stone Bahr 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     




    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
The possibility of an enemy attack using biological weapons (BW) remains one of the biggest threats to 
U.S. and global security. U.S. defense and deterrence policies are based on the assumption that the perpetrator 
can be quickly and reliably identified. If perpetrators can conduct attacks without the fear of attribution or 
punishment, they can act with impunity. The ability to punish, therefore, rests on the ability to identify the 
perpetrator. Thus, the goal of attribution is at the root of all national security strategies. Unfortunately, there are 
three reasons why the attribution of BW attacks are very difficult: (1) the nature of biological weapons, (2) the 
unique restrictions the international environment places on BW attribution, and (3) the bureaucratic constraints 
and organizational overlap that domestic political environments can impose if a BW attack occurs. This thesis 
thus provides a basic epistemological framework for analysis for successful BW attribution, detailing the nature, 
methods, and limits of current BW attribution capabilities. 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
141 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Biological Weapons Attribution; Biodefense; Epidemiology; Forensic 
Microbiology; Sverdlovsk; Amerithrax; Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC), 
Anthrax  


















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ATTRIBUTION: 
A PRIMER 
 
Elizabeth L. Stone Bahr 
B.A., University of California, Santa Barbara, 2003 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS 

























Dr. Douglas Porch 
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK. 
 v
ABSTRACT 
The possibility of an enemy attack using biological weapons (BW) remains one of 
the biggest threats to U.S. and global security. U.S. defense and deterrence policies are 
based on the assumption that the perpetrator can be quickly and reliably identified. If 
perpetrators can conduct attacks without the fear of attribution or punishment, they can 
act with impunity. The ability to punish, therefore, rests on the ability to identify the 
perpetrator. Thus, the goal of attribution is at the root of all national security strategies. 
Unfortunately, there are three reasons why the attribution of BW attacks are very 
difficult: (1) the nature of biological weapons, (2) the unique restrictions the international 
environment places on BW attribution, and (3) the bureaucratic constraints and 
organizational overlap that domestic political environments can impose if a BW attack 
occurs. This thesis thus provides a basic epistemological framework for analysis for 
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A.  DETERRENCE OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IN A POST 9/11 THREAT 
ENVIRONMENT 
The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and 
technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear 
weapons…occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a 
catastrophic power to strike great nations…  
– President George W. Bush1 
 
The possibility of an enemy attack using biological weapons (BW) on U.S. soil, 
U.S. allies, or troops abroad remains one of the biggest threats to U.S. and global 
security. The U.S. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 
emphasizes the diversity and unpredictability of such attacks and the need for new 
methods to deter the development and use of such weapons.2  In today’s threat 
environment, the United States has reserved the right to use all options—including the 
use of nuclear weapons—in response to a biological weapon attack by an enemy.3 
Current and traditional approaches to U.S. defense and deterrence policies are 
based on one key assumption: that the perpetrator can be easily and reliably identified. 
Deterrence and national defense policies rest on the premise that those planning or 
responsible for attacks will be punished. If perpetrators can conduct attacks without the 
fear or possibility of punishment, they can act with impunity. The ability to punish, 
therefore, rests on the ability to identify the perpetrator. Thus, the goal that countries can 
successfully identify the perpetrator of an attack—the problem of attribution—is at the 
root of all national security strategies.  
                                                 
1 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002). Accessible at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf on January 15, 2005. 
2 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (December 2002). Accessible at: 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/16092.pdf on January 15, 2006. 
3 See Victor A. Utgoff, “Nuclear Weapons and the Deterrence of Biological and Chemical Weapons,” 
Henry L. Stimson Center Occasional Paper no. 36 (October 1997). Accessed at: 
http://www.stimson.org/wmd/pdf/utgoff.pdf on March 11, 2007. 
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Despite this assumption, the correct and rapid attribution of biological weapons 
use remains very challenging. The ability to quickly and accurately link a biological 
outbreak to a particular biological agent and a specific perpetrator is essential if U.S. 
deterrence policies are to be effective.  
Biological weapons attribution is an extremely complex problem. Biological 
agents are unique weapons, whose peculiarities make them significantly more difficult to 
attribute than any other WMD. Unless these challenges to the successful attribution of a 
BW attack are properly understood, U.S. defense policies will remain inadequate and 
ineffective—both at home and abroad. This thesis answers the question of why BW 
attribution is so difficult to achieve. Three reasons as to why BW attribution is so difficult 
are presented—the nature of biological weapons, the unique restrictions the international 
environment places on efforts of BW attribution, and the constraints domestic political 
environments can impose if a BW attack occurs. This thesis thus provides a basic 
epistemological framework for analysis on successful BW attribution, detailing the 
nature, methods, and limits of current BW attribution capabilities. 
Despite increased awareness of the threat of biological weapons to U.S. national 
security and the problem they pose for identifying perpetrators4—the United States 
remains significantly under-prepared for truly defeating the biological weapons threat 
because it has not adequately addressed the problem of attribution. The United States 
may be making advances on identifying, responding to, and containing a BW outbreak, 
but it lacks the ability to identify and penalize the perpetrators of a BW attack. The 
unique nature of biological weapons makes the timely identification, characterization, 
and attribution of an attack critical, if policies of deterrence are ever to be effective both 
domestically and internationally. Without understanding the complexities of BW 
attribution, the perpetrator of any future BW attack will most likely remain 
unidentified—making stated U.S. and international bio-security policies ineffective and 
leaving future BW aggressors undeterred. 
 
                                                 
4 “Biodefense for the 21st Century,” The White House, April 28, 2004. Accessed at: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/20040430.html on January 15, 2006.  
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B. CHALLENGES OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ATTRIBUTION  
This chapter introduces the three major challenges of the successful attribution of 
a biological weapons attack: the nature of the weapons themselves, and the constraints 
created by domestic and international politics. This chapter first describes the challenges 
of biological weapons attribution, and why biological weapons—unlike nuclear and 
chemical weapons—are unique and much more difficult WMD to defeat and deter. Next 
it briefly details the specific deterrence conundrum of biological weapons—the problem 
of attribution—and how this conundrum affects U.S. biodefense policies. It then presents 
the controversy surrounding U.S. biodefense and how this controversy affects U.S. 
biodefense policies, including that of preemption.  
1. The Unique Nature of Biological Weapons: Lack of Signatures 
One of the biggest causes of concern regarding the deliberate use of biological 
weapons is the fact that the goals of biological warfare—to cause death and disease 
among enemy troops, civilians, plants, or animals—can also be symptomatic of a natural 
epidemic or disease outbreak. Because BW attacks consist of live organisms, toxins, 
viruses, and bacteria that are endemic and naturally occurring in some populations, there 
may be substantial potential for ambiguity about the origin—deliberate or natural—of 
any particular outbreak.5 As stated in the White House’s “Biodefense for the 21st 
Century,” 
Biological weapons attacks could cause catastrophic harm. They could 
inflict widespread injury and result in massive casualties and economic 
disruption. Bioterror attacks could mimic naturally occurring disease, 
potentially delaying recognition of an attack and creating uncertainty 
about whether one had even occurred. An attacker may thus believe that 
he could escape identification and capture or retaliation.6 
 
                                                 
5 Mark L Wheelis, “Investigation of Suspicious Outbreaks of Disease,” in Raymond Zilinskas, 
Biological Warfare: Modern Offense and Defense (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000). 
6 “Biodefense for the 21st Century,” The White House, April 28, 2004. Accessed at: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/20040430.html on January 15, 2006. 
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Thus, unlike chemical and/or nuclear weapons, which have components not 
normally present in natural environments and that do possess identifiable signatures—
alerting the world not only to their use, but also to the most likely perpetrator—biological 
weapons lack visibly identifiable signatures.7 The agents often produce identifiable 
affects, but it is often unclear if the outbreak was caused by a deliberate of natural 
outbreak. Because BW weapons use live organisms that must incubate within a host 
before the effects can be seen or known, it is entirely plausible that a state or non-state 
actor could release a BW weapon and the world would not even know a WMD had been 
released for days or even weeks. For example, as will be discussed below, an anthrax 
outbreak can be both naturally occurring, as well as the result of a deliberate attack. 
However, because the anthrax organism takes a few days to incubate within a host and 
the onset of recognizable symptoms usually does not occur for two to three days after 
infection, a lot of valuable evidence of a deliberate attack can be lost simply because a 
person could have been exposed and infected with anthrax, but may not even know they 
were infected until after a week or two of the initial exposure. 
2. The Problem of Biological Weapons Attribution: A Typology 
 Attribution can be defined as the ability to link an outbreak to a particular 
biological cause or source at a particular place and time, as well as linking the outbreak to 
the work of a specified human perpetrator. In short, the problem of attribution has three 
parts: identification of a biological outbreak, characterization of that outbreak as non-
natural and deliberate, and identification of the perpetrator. In the case of biological 
weapons, before an attack can even be attributed, investigators first must examine a scene 
and identify and characterize an outbreak before a perpetrator can be identified. 
a. Identify the Cause of a Biological Event 
Different weapons often possess distinct, identifiable signatures that 
indicate their use. Nuclear weapons have the well-known signature of the mushroom 
cloud. Chemical weapons also sometimes characteristically display a signature cloud 
                                                 
7 BW agents do lack visibly identifiable signature, but as will be discussed in Chapter II, BW agents 
can possess signatures at a molecular level. 
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when released, and potential victims can often see clouds of chemicals looming toward 
them before they are exposed to deadly gases. Biological weapons, however, almost 
entirely lack identifiable signatures. Crowds of people can be exposed to an onslaught of 
a weaponized biological agent, and not see, hear, taste, or smell any change in their 
environment.8 Biological weapons truly are silent killers. 
Because of the lack of signatures associated with a BW attack, 
investigators must first examine a particular disease outbreak and be able to identify 
whether the outbreak is a natural or unnatural epidemic. This first step sounds simple 
enough, but can be incredibly difficult to ascertain.  
Biological weapons can be used in a myriad of ways, including the use of 
BW on crops, livestock, small groups of people, and even on targeted individuals as a 
form of assassination attempt. Perpetrators can be skilled enough to release just the right 
amount of disease agent in order to emulate a disease outbreak—so as to go unnoticed 
and unattributed—and have the disease outbreak be categorized as natural. Therefore, 
before the use of BW can be properly attributed, one must first be able to identity that a 
particular disease outbreak was, in fact, the result of a deliberate attack and not simply a 
natural outbreak of disease. 
b. Characterize the Nature of the Biological Event: Deliberate or 
Not 
After a particular disease outbreak is concretely labeled unnatural, and the 
result of biological weapons use, investigators must then be able to characterize the event 
as deliberate or not. Was it an accidental release of BW? There are many questions that 
need to be answered in order for a BW attack to be characterized, and large amounts of 
evidence are needed to concretely answer all of these characterization questions. 
                                                 
8 See Marilyn W. Thompson, The Killer Strain (New York: HarperCollins Publishers Inc., 2003), p. 
44, for more information on the findings of Project White Coat, a series of tests between 1954 and 1973 by 
the U.S. military using human volunteers to analyze how bacteriological agents move through the human 
body. The volunteers were conscientious objectors who agreed to be infected with debilitating pathogens. 
In return, they were exempted from frontline warfare. Many of the volunteers in Project White Coat 
reported that they could not hear, taste, or smell any change in their environments while they were being 
exposed to various biological weapons agents. The White Coat volunteers were not infected with the most 
lethal microbes; their role was to test the effectiveness of new vaccines and antibiotics and as soon as they 
became ill, they were given medical treatment.  
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However, this step in the typology is critical—before the perpetrator of a BW attack can 
be identified, the attack must first be categorized as unnatural, and then the outbreak must 
be characterized as criminal and deliberate so concrete evidence can be collected. 
c. Attribute the Outbreak to a Perpetrator 
Lastly, there is the process of attribution. Once an outbreak has been 
identified as unnatural and characterization evidence has been collected and analyzed, the 
formal attribution of a BW attack can be advanced, and informal hypotheses about the 
perpetrators discarded. The attribution process, however, is not necessarily a linear 
progression—these sequences will most likely overlap in certain situations, and evidence 
and events may unfold more like a jigsaw puzzle before the overall picture is revealed. 
Even if one follows the attribution typology, however, it does not guarantee the 
successful attribution of a BW attack. Like in criminal homicide cases, sometimes—
despite the evidence—the guilty party remains at large. 
3. The Deterrence Conundrum  
While the U.S. government has advanced new measures that assist in 
“confronting the biological weapons threat,” including the establishment of BioWatch 
programs that detect biological weapons attacks, increasing the Strategic National 
Stockpile of medicines for treating victims of bioterror attacks, and increasing funding 
for bioterrorism research, the United States remains under-prepared in for BW 
attribution.9 Even if new technology could alert the U.S. government within twenty-four 
hours that a BW agent has been released so that government officials may be able to 
control the spread of the disease and treat victims of the attack, the mechanisms and 
efforts to determine exactly who it was that launched the attack remain largely 
underdeveloped and ignored.10 
                                                 
9 Biodefense for the 21st Century,” The White House, April 28, 2004. Accessed at: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/20040430.html on January 15, 2006. 
10 See Margaret E. Kosal, “The Basics of Biological and Chemical Weapons Detectors,” Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies, Research Story of the Week 23 November 2003, for further information on the 
limitations of biological agent detectors. Accessed at: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/031124.htm on March 
12, 2006. 
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If “deterrence is the historical cornerstone of U.S. defense,”11 the current policies 
of U.S. biodefense measures must credibly convince potential criminals to not engage in 
criminal activities for fear that they will be apprehended and punished. In order for a BW 
user to fear punishment, norms, laws, and enforcement must be designed and 
implemented to enable governments to attribute attacks to perpetrators and to 
communicate that capacity to would-be attackers. The current norms, laws, and BW 
enforcement policies are significantly lacking in their ability to identify and attribute BW 
outbreaks and—to date—have failed to apprehend and punish BW violators. Thus, BW 
deterrence is falling short of its policy objectives. 
Though the unique characteristics of biological weapons make attributing who 
used or released them extremely difficult to determine, attribution is possible. By 
understanding the unique epidemiology of biological weapons agents, coupled with the 
advancement of microbial forensics and more sound international and domestic policies 
that allow for more effective BW outbreak investigations, BW attribution—and not just 
detection—can be successful. With a firm understanding of the challenges of BW 
attribution, the United States will be in better position to reliably attribute the source of a 
BW attack, and respond as specified in its national security and defense strategies. 
4. The Transnational Threat 
If the focus of contemporary U.S. biodefense measures center around a mission of 
not only the overall security for the American people and U.S. allies, but also deterrence 
of the future use of BW, the United States government and its allies must recognize and 
address the perplexing problem of BW attribution—both at home and abroad.  
In order for any U.S. biodefense measures to successfully deter any future BW 
user, both the U.S. government, as well as other national governments that are members 
of anti-BW proliferation regimes, must be able and willing to cooperate to determine and 
deter who it was that released a BW agent, not just what agent was released. BW 
Proliferation regimes like the BTWC and the Australia Group have long asserted that—
due to the trans-boundary threat of biological diseases—the international community 
                                                 
11 “Biodefense for the 21st Century,” The White House, April 28, 2004. Accessed at: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/20040430.html on January 15, 2006. 
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must work together and cooperate with BW detection and investigation if attribution is 
ever to be achieved.12 Biological weapons policy objectives must begin with detection 
and response, but have an end-game plan of apprehension, and—perhaps most 
importantly—prosecution, if laws prohibiting the use of BW are ever to be taken 
seriously and BW proliferation is ever hoped to be controlled or destroyed. 
The BW threat is transnational. It is not just state actors that potentially could use 
BW on U.S. populations, troops, and allies; the threat also comes from non-state actors. 
The fear that Saddam Hussein or Kim Jung Il would ever obtain and use biological 
weapons on U.S. citizens and troops abroad has caused a lot of political and tactical 
consternation for defense planners. The threat of a non-state actor, like an Al Qaeda 
agent, obtaining and using BW on U.S. citizens within the United States causes an equal 
amount of consternation and fear for defense planners. Since the BW threat is 
transnational, the solution to countering the BW threat must also be transnational. As was 
outlined in the U.S. National Security Strategy, 
While our focus is protecting America, we know that to defeat terrorism in 
today’s globalized world we need support from our allies and friends. 
Wherever possible, the United States will rely on regional organizations 
and state powers to meet their obligations to fight terrorism. Where 
governments find the fight against terrorism beyond their capacities, we 
will match their willpower and their resources with whatever help we and 
our allies can provide.13 
In 1972, the international community joined together to create the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), seeking the total disarmament and prohibition of 
biological weapons around the world.14 The current members of the BTWC and other 
states and parties hoping to stop the proliferation and future use of BW must realize that 
the biological weapons threat, and subsequent deterrence policies, must be thought of 
cyclically. If state or non-state actors know that they can acquire and use BW without  
 
                                                 
12 See The Australia Group Objectives, at: http://www.australiagroup.net/en/agobj.htm. 
13 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002). Accessed at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf on January 12, 2005. 
14 For a list of current state parties to the BTWC, as well as those states who have yet to ratify the 
Convention, see: http://www.opbw.org/.  
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fear of identification or reprisal, they—and other—states will continue to proliferate, 
acquire, and use BW; no actor will be deterred from such behavior because there is no 
fear of reprisal  
Alternatively, if expedient and accurate investigation and attribution of the release 
of a BW agent were possible, an actor would fear reprisal and prosecution for his 
actions—and would also fear proliferating, acquiring, or using BW in the future. 
Deterrence would be improved, and the BW threat cycle would be slowed, disrupted, or 
broken completely  
Therefore, in order for the threat of BW use to be quelled and/or eventually 
defeated, the attribution problem is critical. Without the fear of punishment, made 
possible by attribution, future BW users will remain undeterred.  
C. METHODOLOGY, ROADMAP, AND SOURCES 
1. Methodology 
 This thesis analyzes a specific problem of arms control—the successful attribution 
of a suspected intentional disease outbreak, as well as a parallel examination of two 
cases: the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak, and the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United 
States (the Amerithrax case).These parallel examinations are designed to highlight the 
numerous technical, forensic, political, and psychological complexities of biological 
weapons attribution, and also focus attention on the potential areas for improving BW 
attribution.  
In addition to analyzing, in detail, the three main impediments to successful BW 
attribution, this thesis explains how these impediments materialized in the 1979 
Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak and the 2001 Amerithrax anthrax outbreak.  
2.  Sources 
 In addition to reviewing primary and secondary literature as sources, this thesis 
incorporates data from current public health monitoring websites, congressional records, 
UN Security Council Resolutions, draft protocols, texts, government speeches, as well as 
declassified intelligence documents. Additionally, a major contribution to this thesis was 
person interviews scholars in the field, as well as with sources within the FBI that would 
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like to remain anonymous. And lastly, some of the information for this thesis came from 
discussions with scholars and government officials at an international conference entitled, 
“Identification, Characterization, and Attribution of Biological Weapons Use,” organized 
by the Center for Contemporary Conflict, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, in 
collaboration with King's College London Centre for Science and Security Studies and 
the Economic and Social Research Council (UK), and with support from the Advanced 
Systems and Concepts Office, U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency.15 
3.  Overall Thesis Roadmap 
a.  Chapter II 
Following this introduction chapter, Chapter II describes the nature of 
biological weapons, the first of three major reasons why the attribution of a biological 
weapons attack is so difficult. Understanding the nature of BW agents is key to the first 
and second steps in the attribution typology—identification and characterization. 
Examining the complex nature of biological weapons agents, Chapter II delves deeply 
into the specifics of disease ecology and the importance of understanding the 
epidemiology of a suspected agent in order to successfully attribute a disease outbreak. 
Epidemiology is the branch of medicine and scientific research that deals with the 
detection of the source and cause of infectious disease outbreaks. The epidemiology of a 
biological warfare agent is extremely complex, and sets the stage for the entire 
subsequent investigation of the outbreak. It is often an agent’s epidemiological factors 
that provide the first clues of criminal intent during a disease outbreak, and distinguish a 
BW attack from a natural disease outbreak.16 Chapter II introduces four main categories 
of epidemiology that serve as identifying biological categories that are critical to any 
outbreak investigation—agent pathogenicity, infectivity, incubation period, and 
                                                 
15 See Dr. Anne Clunan, Dr. Peter R. Lavoy, and Ms. Elizabeth Stone Bahr, “Identification, 
Characterization, and Attribution of Biological Weapons Use,” Center for Contemporary Conflict 
Conference Report (December 2006). Accessed at: 
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/events/recent/bwconferenceDec06_rpt.asp on March 22, 2007. 
16 Jay C. Butler, Mitchell L. Cohen, Cindy R. Friedman, Robert M. Scripp, and Craig G. Watz, 
“Collaboration Between Public Health and Law Enforcement: New Paradigms and Partnerships for 
Bioterrorism Planning and Response,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 8, no. 10 (October 2002). Found at: 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol8no10/02-0400.htm, accessed February 1, 2006. 
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virulence—and develop them with regard to bacillus anthracis or anthrax, the agent 
released in the USSR in 1979 and the United States in 2001. 
b. Chapter III 
The four epidemiology categories introduced in Chapter II must be 
thoroughly understood and analyzed during outbreak investigations so that all available 
clues as to what caused the disease outbreak can be successfully discerned, and the 
perpetrator of the attack can be properly attributed. Applying these to anthrax, Chapter III 
brings in examples from the cases of Sverdlovsk and Amerithrax to highlight how the 
nature of the biological weapons agent—anthrax—affects BW investigation and 
attribution. 
c.  Chapter IV 
Chapter IV introduces another major hurdle to the successful attribution of 
a BW attack: the restrictions and complications international political environments place 
on the successful attribution of a BW attack. The actual location of a disease outbreak 
significantly influences the subsequent investigation of the epidemic. Contemporary 
international relations, norms, laws, and diplomacy all play a major part in either the 
successful attribution, or the complete sabotage of an investigation. However, knowledge 
of international laws and norms is not the same thing as compliance with international 
laws and norms. This chapter highlights the significance of international relations for 
attributing a BW disease outbreak, particularly in light of an ever-increasingly 
transnational BW threat. International cooperation is essential for compliance with BW 
outbreak detection, investigation, and attribution efforts. 
d.  Chapter V 
Chapter V introduces another major challenge to the successful 
investigation and attribution of a BW attack by discussing the nature of the domestic 
political environment at the time of an alleged outbreak. A successful investigation of a 
disease outbreak is completely dependent on the cooperation of numerous national actors, 
including the victims of the epidemic, the public health officials in the locality of the 
 12
outbreak, the team doing the disease investigations, the government agencies initiating 
the investigation, and the local authorities where the disease outbreak took place. Chapter 
V highlights the complexities of domestic political environments on the successful 
attribution of BW use. Chapter V compares the general constraints imposed by domestic 
politics with the specific analysis of the domestic political environments during both the 
1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak in the Soviet Union, as well as the hurdles of the 
strained, post-9/11 domestic political environment in the United States during the 2001 
Amerithrax outbreak. This comparison furthers our understanding of how domestic 
environments where a government is the responsible “perpetrator” differ from those 
where the perpetrator was a non-state actor, and the difficulties of attribution under both 
sets of circumstances. 
e. Chapter VI 
Chapter VI, the conclusion, begins by reviewing the risks of failing to 
identify the source of an unnatural disease outbreak. It begins by briefly summarizing the 
three preceding chapters’ conclusions on the problem of BW attribution, and will use this 
analysis to support the argument that successful BW deterrence is predicated on 
successful BW attribution. This analysis also supports the argument that the problem of 
attribution requires solutions to overcome the obstacles of the unique nature of biological 
weapons, as well as the complexities of the intra-governmental and international 
cooperation needed to coordinate attribution efforts. 
The chapter concludes by showing how the combination of understanding 
both the integral steps of the attribution typology, as well as understanding a suspected 
agent’s epidemiology and the nature of the domestic and international political 
environment at the scene of the outbreak, can ultimately lead to the success or the total 
failure of the ultimate attribution of the illegal use of biological weapons. The three main 
policy recommendations that can be taken away from this thesis are also presented: (1) 
BW attribution is not just a technical problem; policy-makers must continue to advance 
the capabilities of forensic epidemiology and microbiology. (2) The United States cannot 
solve the BW attribution problem if it acts in isolation. Disease—naturally occurring or 
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deliberately released—is a transnational problem. (3) Domestically, U.S. policy makers 
must push for new laws and standard operating procedures on BW investigation, 
evidence collection, and sample testing in the event of a domestic BW attack, and a 
ubiquitous, Congressionally-approved standard or proof for initiating a BW investigation 
must be established to ensure not only the attribution of a BW attack, but also the 
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II. UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF THE AGENT: THE 
IMPORTANCE OF EPIDEMIOLOGY FOR DISEASE 
INVESTIGATION AND ATTRIBUTION 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explains the vital importance of epidemiology—the branch of 
medicine that studies the causes, distribution, and control of disease in populations—on 
the investigation and attribution of an outbreak of disease caused by the release of a 
biological weapons agent. Infectious diseases can be classified according to their 
epidemiologic, clinical, and/or microbiologic features, and detailed knowledge of these 
characteristics are critical for the expeditious identification, investigation, and attribution 
of a BW agent. It is often an agent’s microbiologic factors that provide the first clues of 
criminal intent during a disease outbreak.17 Without an understanding of an agent’s 
epidemiology, multiple lives and critical forensic evidence can be lost simply trying to 
identify a suspected infectious disease.  
Chapter II is both technical and analytical. The chapter begins by describing the 
unique problem of biological weapons and the role infectious disease epidemiology plays 
in the attribution of the use of biological weapons. The chapter then identifies the 
characteristics of pathogenicity, infectivity, incubation period, and virulence to highlight 
the vital importance of understanding disease epidemiology. These three categories of 
indicators are unique to every organism, and each category should be rigorously assessed 
and analyzed if one is to, at any point, successfully attribute a biological weapons attack.  
Next, Chapter II describes the pathogen Bacillus  anthracis—commonly known as 
anthrax—as a case study agent to assess the unique characteristics of the pathogenicity, 
infectivity, incubation period, and virulence of a BW agent. Anthrax was chosen as a case 
study agent because fears of it being used as a biological weapon began more than eighty 
                                                 
17 Jay C. Butler, et al. “Collaboration Between Public Health and Law Enforcement: New Paradigms 
and Partnerships for Bioterrorism Planning and Response.” Emerging Infectious Diseases 8, no. 10 
(October 2002). Accessed at: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol8no10/02-0400.htm on December 18, 
2005.  
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years ago.18 Also, in 1999, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) created 
A, B, and C lists of biological agents that terrorists could use to harm civilians. An expert 
panel of doctors and scientists classified anthrax as a Category A bioterror agent. The 
CDC bioterror lists represent the biological agents that pose the greatest threats to 
national security due to their ease of transmission, high rate of death or serious illness, 
potential for causing public panic, and special public health measures an epidemic would 
require.19 Thus, the threat of a biological weapons attack involving anthrax has been 
more studied and more feared than many other disease agents. Additionally, biologically 
engineered anthrax was the source of both the 1979 Sverdlovsk outbreak, as well as the 
anthrax outbreaks in the United States in the weeks after September 11th.  
Chapter II then uses the findings of the biological agent evaluation—
understanding the technical significance of agent pathogenicity, infectivity and 
incubation period, and virulence—and applies the same evaluation to analyze the specific 
epidemiological complications of the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak and the 2001 
American anthrax outbreak. By juxtaposing generic, technical epidemiologic analysis 
with these two case studies, this chapter concludes by reaffirming that one of the biggest 
keys to the attribution of the use of biological weapons is simple infectious disease 
epidemiology; without a strong understanding of an organism’s epidemiologic make-up, 
the successful attribution of the criminal use of a weaponized organism, as well as hopes 
of saving any victims of a BW attack, is incredibly jeopardized. 
B. THE UNIQUE PROBLEMS OF BW ATTRIBUTION   
Organisms and the diseases they are capable of unleashing are extremely 
complicated entities. The investigation and attribution of the suspected release of a 
weaponized disease-causing organism are equally as complicated. The use or alleged use 
of any WMD would immediately involve government officials, investigators, and 
forensic experts to attempt to identify the perpetrator of the attack. The unique thing 
                                                 
18 G.W. Christopher, “Biological Warfare: A Historical Perspective,” Journal of the American 
Medical Association 278, no. 5 (August 6, 1997): 412-417. 
19 National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease, “Anthrax,” National Institute of Health, U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, December 2005. Accessed at: 
http://www.niaid.nih.gov/factsheets/anthrax.htm on February 5, 2006. 
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about biological weapons, however—unlike nuclear or chemical weapons—is the fact 
that BW agents are alive and some can be found naturally around the world at any given 
moment. Because disease epidemics and pandemics occur naturally around the globe 
every day, the attribution of a biological weapons attack is first and foremost dependent 
on the successful identification of the organism that was used in the attack. As stated 
above, it is often an agent’s microbiologic factors that provide the first clues of criminal 
intent during a disease outbreak.20 Without a thorough understanding of how a particular 
organism acts naturally in its endemic environment, an actual biological weapons attack 
could occur, and public health officials could miss all the clues that would indicate the 
outbreak of disease was in fact not a natural epidemic, but instead the result of a 
biological weapons agent. 
C. BIOLOGICAL THUMB PRINTS: FOUR KEY FACTORS IN AGENT 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 
Every single organism possesses unique biological characteristics that can serve 
as an identifying thumb print. The four epidemiological categories of pathogenicity, 
infectivity, incubation period, and virulence always need to be assessed when 
investigating the suspected release of a BW agent in order to control the spread of the 
outbreak, properly diagnose and treat victims of the outbreak, and to investigate the agent 










                                                 
20 Butler, “Collaboration Between Public Health and Law Enforcement: New Paradigms and 
Partnerships for Bioterrorism Planning and Response.” 
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Table 1.   Epidemiological Categories Important to the Attribution of a BW attack. 
Pathogenicity Ability of a microbial agent to 
induce disease. 
Infectivity  Minimum number of infectious 




Time between exposure to an 
infectious agent and the onset of 
symptoms or signs of infection. 
Virulence Measured by the case fatality rate 
or as the proportion of clinical 
cases that develop severe disease. 
 
1. Pathogenicity 
 A pathogen is an organism capable of causing disease. Pathogens are infectious 
agents that cause disease and include viruses, bacteria, fungi, protozoa and higher 
parasites. Pathogenicity refers to the ability of a microbial agent to induce disease.21 
Understanding an agent’s pathogenicity helps physicians and clinicians better understand 
how an agent makes a victim ill. Pathogenicity helps answer the question of exactly how 
an agent invades a host and takes over a victim’s immune system. 
 When it comes to agents used as biological weapons, the pathogenicity of an 
agent becomes a critical piece of the ultimate attribution of the attack. For some agents—
such as anthrax—a certain strain can invade a host in more than one way. Public health 
officials, emergency responders, and clinicians must have a thorough understanding of 
disease pathogenicity as an epidemiologic identifier, or the actual cause of disease can be 
misdiagnosed or missed altogether. The eventual attribution of the agent and source of a 
BW attack largely depends on properly identifying an agent’s pathogenicity, for it is the 
pathogenicty of an agent that gives the biggest clues to the source of infection—whether 
the source of the infection was from something a person ingested or something a person 
breathed in from the air, etc. The pathogenecity gives investigators a better idea of the 
type of “crime scene” they should be focusing on for purposes of attribution. 
                                                 
21 Kenrad E, Nelson, Carolyn Masters Williams, Neil MH Graham, Infectious Disease Epidemiology: 
Theory and Practice (Aspen Publishers, Inc., 2001), 27. 
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2. Infectivity  
When faced with the daunting task of identifying a suspected agent in a disease 
outbreak or epidemic, another critical thing epidemiologists need to firmly identify is an 
agent’s infectivity. Infectivity is the ability of an agent to cause infection in a susceptible 
host.22 The basic measure of infectivity is the minimum number of infectious particles 
required to establish an infection.23 In communicable diseases that spread from person to 
person—such as Ebola or Marburg—the proportion of susceptible individuals who 
develop infection after exposure (called the secondary attack rate) is a measure of the 
infectivity of an organism. 
Infectivity is a good indicator that a particular outbreak is unnatural and the result 
of the use of BW weapon, versus a natural, endemic outbreak. If a particular agent 
outbreak usually causes ten to fifty people or animals to become sick, but a specific 
outbreak has infected 200 to 400 people, this level of infectivity is a red flag that the 
outbreak was not natural. By identifying the minimum infectivity of an agent, public 
health officials and government planners can gain a better grasp on precisely how many 
people are potentially infected, and ultimately how many victims the biological agent 
could claim. It is agent infectivity that makes biological weapons potentially more 
destructive than any other weapon of mass destruction.  
3. Virulence 
Virulence is defined as the severity of the disease after infection occurs.24 Some 
fields use the terms virulence and pathogenicity interchangeably, but for purposes of 
understanding disease in the context of biological weapons, it is useful and important to 
consider these two terms to be separate properties of an infectious agent. Virulence is 
most often measured by the case fatality rate or as the proportion of clinical cases that 
develop severe disease.25  
                                                 
22 Kenrad E, Nelson, Carolyn Masters Williams, Neil MH Graham, Infectious Disease Epidemiology: 





Some diseases can be pathogenic and cause diseases which produce various 
symptoms, but other diseases are both pathogenic and virulent. An example would be 
smallpox and rhinoviruses26—both are pathogenic, but smallpox infections are much 
more virulent.27 This distinction is important for purposes of studying biological weapons 
agents because both a weaponized and a naturally occurring agent can have the same 
pathogencity, but the agent can have an extremely more lethal virulence in its 
weaponized form. Anthrax, for example, can infect its host in the same manners in both 
its natural and weaponized form—either cutaneously through the skin, gastrointestinally 
through the stomach by being eaten with rotten food, or pulmonarily when breathed in 
through the lungs. However, the virulence of weaponized versus naturally occurring 
anthrax once it has achieved its pathogenesis can have dramatically different results; 
weaponized anthrax is much more virulent. The virulence of a disease is some times 
dependent on the pathogenicity of the disease; how a particular agent invades a host can 
determine the relative virulence of the particular agent in that specific circumstance—this 
will be further elucidated in the example of anthrax’s virulence levels, discussed below. 
In fact, it is often a disease outbreaks heightened level of virulence that provides 
investigators with the first clue that an un-natural, potential BW outbreak of disease has 
occurred. This is why it is important that pathogenecity and virulence be examined as 
separate epidemiological thumb prints needed for successful BW attribution. 
4. Incubation Period 
The incubation period of an infectious disease is the time between exposure to an 
infectious agent and the onset of symptoms or signs of infection.28 Once a suspected BW 
agent and its pathogenesis (how it has infected its host) is identified, it is often the 
incubation period that provides the most solid forensic evidence that ultimately leads to a 
successful attribution of an outbreak or potential attack. The incubation period for 
                                                 
26 Rhinoviruses are the most common viral infective agents in humans. The most well-known disease 
caused by rhinoviruses is the common cold. There are over 100 virus types that cause cold symptoms, and 
rhinoviruses are responsible for approximately 50 percent of all cases. 
27 Nelson, Infectious Disease Epidemiology: Theory and Practice, 27. 
28 Nelson, Infectious Disease Epidemiology: Theory and Practice, 26. 
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infectious diseases always show some variation, which occurs for a variety of reasons, 
including: the dose or inoculum of the infectious agent, the route of inoculation, and the 
rate of replication of the organism.29 However, despite this variance, if one can 
successfully track the emergence of a disease based on its suspected incubation period, 
one can usually find that a plot of the incubation period for persons exposed at the same 
time follows a normal log distribution, and times and places of infection for each casualty 
can usually be reliably deduced. This information can sometimes provide solid evidence 
to an exact location and time—the when and where—of the release of a biological 
weapon agent, and potentially bring an investigation one giant step closer to the 
successful attribution, and understanding of who was responsible. 
D. TECHNICAL BIOLOGICAL THUMB PRINTS AND BACILLUS 
ANTHRACIS  
Bacillus Anthracis derives from the Greek word for coal, anthrakis, because the 
disease causes black, coal-like skin lesions (See Image 1).30 
 
   
Image 1. Two examples of necrotic skin lesions caused by a cutaneous anthrax 
infection.31 
 
                                                 
29 Nelson, Infectious Disease Epidemiology: Theory and Practice, 27. 
30 Thomas V. Inglesby, “Anthrax as a Biological Weapons: Medical and Public Health Management,” 
Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) 281, no. 18 (May 12, 1999), 1737. 
31 Pictures from American College of Physicians: Internal Medicine, Bioterrorism. Accessed at 
www.acponline.org/bioterro/anthrax/cut_anth.htm, on March 10, 2007. 
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The major sources of natural human anthrax infections are through direct or 
indirect contact with infected animals, or occupational exposure to infected contaminated 
animal products.32Anthrax spores, which are aerobic and gram-positive, germinate when 
they enter an environment rich in amino acids, nucleosides, and glucose—such as that 
found in the blood or tissue of an animal or human host. 33 Anthrax can be found 
globally, and is endemic and more common in developing countries or countries without 
veterinary public health programs. Certain regions of the world (South and Central 
America, Southern and Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and the Middle East) 
report more anthrax in animals than others.34 Also, anthrax is not a communicable 
disease, meaning that it cannot be spread from person to person.  
Before delving into the identifying signatures of anthrax, it is worthy to note that 
it is possible to classify organisms based on the three identifying characteristics of 
infectivity, pathogenicity, and virulence, and very few diseases in the world can be 
classified as ranking high in any single category; anthrax is one of the diseases that ranks 
high in all three categories. This fact makes anthrax a very attractive biological weapon. 
(See Table  2). 
Table 2.   Classification of Disease Rankings.35 
SEVERITY INFECTIVITY PATHOGENICITY VIRULENCE 
HIGH Smallpox, measles, 
chicken pox, anthrax 
Smallpox, rabies, 
measles, anthrax, 





INTERMEDIATE Rubella, mumps, 
common cold 
Rubella, mumps Poliomyelitis, 
measles 




VERY LOW Leprosy Leprosy Rubella, common 
cold 
 
                                                 
32 PCB Turnbull, Guidelines for the Surveillance and Control of Anthrax in Humans and Animals, 3rd 
Edition (World Health Organization: Emerging and Other Communicable Diseases, Surveillance and 
Control), 10. 
33 Inglesby, “Anthrax as a Biological Weapons: Medical and Public Health Management,” 1737. 
34 Center for Disease Control and Prevention, “Anthrax,” Division of Bacterial and Mycotic Diseases. 
Found at: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/anthrax_g.htm#What%20is%20anthrax. Accessed 
on February 5, 2006. 
35 Nelson, Infectious Disease Epidemiology: Theory and Practice, 27. 
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1. Anthrax Pathogenicity 
The pathogenicity of anthrax helps explain why this particular bacterium, as a 
biological weapon, is potentially so disastrous, whereas naturally occurring anthrax is 
now easily preventable and controllable. 
Remembering that pathogenicity helps explain how an organism causes disease—
or literally how the bacteria enters the body of the host—it is extremely important to 
realize that there are three different ways in which the anthrax bacteria can invade a host. 
A person or animal36 can develop gastrointestinal anthrax, cutaneous anthrax, or 
pulmonaryal anthrax. 
a. Gastrointestinal Anthrax Pathogenicity 
A case of gastrointestinal anthrax occurs when a person consumes meat or 
an animal consumes feed meal that is infected with the bacteria. This form of anthrax is 
most commonly found in poorer locations around the world that have inadequate cattle 
breeding practices and lack of resources, where farmers do not vaccinate their animals to 
avoid extra costs, and where unregulated black market meat sales are common. 
A recent outbreak of anthrax in southern Kyrgyzstan highlights the risks 
and distinct pathogenicity of gastrointestinal anthrax. In October 2005, the former Soviet 
Republic in Central Asia reported over two dozen cases of gastrointestinal anthrax, 
forcing doctors to implement a strict quarantine and public officials to close down cattle 
markets to prevent the spread of the disease.37 In Kyrgyzstan, poor farmers and butchers 
commonly graze and slaughter hundreds of animals, year after year, in the same fields 
and slaughter houses. Experts cite places where anthrax infected animals were 
slaughtered and/or buried in the past as the major cause of recent, natural anthrax 
outbreaks. The danger lies in the blood that spills from the animal and drains into the soil, 
                                                 
36 Anthrax is usually an endemic epizootic disease, meaning it can affect a large number of animals at 
the same time within a particular region or geographic area.  
37 Central Asia, “KYRGYZSTAN: Anthrax on the rise in south,” United Nations Integrated Regional 
Information Network (IRIN), October 26, 2005. Accessed at 
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=49765&SelectRegion=Asia&SelectCountry=KYRGYZSTA
N on January 15, 2006.  
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where the anthrax can then assume a protective spore form.38 If an animal is infected 
with anthrax and buried in the ground, other animals grazing upon those grounds can be 
infected with the bacteria emanating from the bodies of the buried animals; the bacteria 
thrives in the soil and grass of the animal burial grounds, and can reinfect other animals 
grazing in those areas.39  
There are more than 550 such anthrax hot spots in southern Kyrgyzstan, 
while only 350 of them have been detected, registered, fenced, and covered with concrete 
to prevent infection in other cattle.40 The majority of these spots remain unattended, and 
there are no warning signs for local people to know not to graze their cattle there. 
Therefore, new animals graze where infected animals are buried, causing new anthrax 
outbreaks in the animal. Once those animals are slaughtered, people consume the infected 
meat of the animals, and—in turn—are overcome by the pathogenesis of gastrointestinal 
anthrax. This vicious circle in Kyrgyzstan is common throughout the undeveloped world, 
and accounts for a large percentage of annual gastrointestinal anthrax cases in humans. 
b. Cutaneous Anthrax Pathogenicity 
Cutaneous anthrax is said to account for 95 percent or more of human 
cases globally.41 Most endemic, naturally occurring cases of anthrax are cutaneous, and 
are contracted by close contact of abraded skin with products derived from infected 
herbivores, principally cattle, sheep, and goats.42 Such products might include hides, hair, 
wool, bone, and meal. A human or animal must have an open cut come in contact with 
the bacteria in order to develop a cutaneous anthrax infection. 
                                                 
38 Jeanne Guillemin, Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press), 3. 
39 Anthrax’s survival in soil depends largely on temperature. If possible, soil at the site of an anthrax 
carcass should be removed up to a depth of 20 cm and incinerated or heat treated. Where it is not feasible to 
incinerate or chemically decontaminate the soil or to remove it to an incinerator, the alternative is to close 
off or seal the site with concrete or tarmac. This scenario becomes heavily relevant later in this Chapter, 
when the Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak is discussed. 
40 Central Asia, “KYRGYZSTAN,” Ibid. 
41 Turnbull, Guidelines for the Surveillance and Control of Anthrax in Humans and Animals, 14. 
42 Theodore J. Cieslak and Edward M. Eitzen, Jr., “Clinical and Epidemiologic Principles of 
Anthrax,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 5, no. 4 (July-August, 1999). Accessed at: 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol5no4/cieslak.htm on January 15, 2006. 
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c. Pulmonary Anthrax Pathogenicity 
Many experts agree that one of the biggest things preventing terrorists 
from dispensing weaponized, aerosolized anthrax onto a population—causing widespread 
cases of pulmonary anthrax infections—is the challenge of the delivery mechanism. A 
person cannot develop pulmonary anthrax unless the released spore size is delivered in 
precisely the right measurement so as to maximize infectivity and virulence, as discussed 
below. It is now known that in June 1993, the Aum Shinrikyo cult sprayed a liquid 
suspension of B. anthracis from its headquarters in Kameido, near Tokyo, Japan.43 This 
release of anthrax went unnoticed, and thankfully resulted in no deaths largely because 
Aum Shinrikyo’s delivery mechanism was unsuccessful.  
Whereas cutaneous and gastrointestinal anthrax are characterized by very 
visible and recognizable symptoms, pulmonary anthrax is much more difficult to 
diagnose—not only because of its complications, but because so few cases have ever 
been reported and documented. Before the 1979 anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk, very 
few doctors had the training or ability to diagnose a case of pulmonary anthrax. And even 
during the 2001 Amerithrax outbreak in the United States, with a sophisticated medical 
community and well-trained physicians, many of the doctors who first had contact with 
the outbreak’s first victims believed their patients were merely suffering from flu or 
fatigue. The doctors had little experience and training in recognizing the symptoms of 
pulmonary anthrax, and some of their patients rapidly died as a result.44 
The unique pathogenesis and subsequent symptoms of the various forms 
of anthrax is extremely important to understand in the event of a BW outbreak.   
2. Anthrax Infectivity  
 A 1993 report by the U.S. Congressional Office of Technology Assessment 
estimated that between 130,000 and three million deaths could follow the aerosolized 
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release of 100 kilograms of anthrax spores upwind of the Washington, D.C. area—
lethality matching or exceeding that of a hydrogen bomb.45 Additionally, of the many 
biological weapons that may be used as weapons, the Working Group on Civilian 
Biodefense has identified anthrax as one of the most serious organisms that could cause 
disease and death in sufficient numbers to cripple a city or region.46 Anthrax has a very 
high level of infectivity, in multiple forms, thus making it a very attractive organism for 
use as a biological weapon.  
 Remembering that infectivity is the minimum number of infectious particles 
required to establish an infection, it is critical to note that the infectivity of anthrax 
depends heavily on its pathogenicity in each circumstance. The level of infectivity is a 
factor that terrorists or states intending to weaponize and disseminate anthrax spores 
would have to pay particular attention in order to maximize resulting infections. One 
must understand an agent’s infectivity in order to properly equip a dissemination device 
with the precise amount of spores needed to cause widespread death and destruction.  
a. Cutaneous Anthrax Infectivity 
It does not take many spores  to initiate a cutaneous anthrax infection, but 
an open cut or abrasion must be present that anthrax spores can gain access to before 
anthrax can cause infection in a host.47 Although few spores need to be present before a 
cutaneous anthrax infection takes root, this version of the disease is readily recognizable, 
presents limited diagnosis, is amenable to therapy with any number of antibiotics, and is 
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b. Gastrointestinal Anthrax Infectivity 
There is very little information on infectious doses of anthrax by the oral, 
gastrointestinal route, but what is true for the skin is probably largely true for the 
oropharyngeal and gastrointestinal epithelium (see above).49 
c. Pulmonary anthrax Infectivity 
Pulmonary anthrax has tremendously more ability to kill victims than 
cutaneous or gastrointestinal anthrax. Although aerosolized anthrax spores are the rarest 
form of anthrax, they are the deadliest form of anthrax, and thus the most likely form that 
weaponized anthrax would be in. A World Health Organization report estimated that in 
the three days after the release of just fifty kilograms of anthrax spores along a two 
kilometer line upwind of a city with a population of 500,000, up to 125,000 infections 
would occur, eventually producing 95,000 deaths after the disease incubates and takes 
hold of its victims.50  
Current biological terrorism models that estimate casualties from the 
release of aerosolized anthrax spores assume a point-release of one kilogram of spores, 
concentrated at a trillion spores per gram.51 This figure gives an approximation as to the 
precise level of infectivity of aerosolized anthrax spores to cause maximum death and 
destruction. Also, anthrax spores lend themselves well to aerosolization and resist 
environmental degradation.52 This fact, coupled with the scenario that it would take just 
fifty kilograms of properly disseminated and aerosolized anthrax to maximize the agent’s 
infectivity levels makes pulmonary anthrax an extremely attractive biological weapons 
option.  
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3. Anthrax Virulence 
The U.S. Department of Defense bases its biological weapons defense strategies 
on the scientific data estimating that the Lethal Dose, 50 Percent (LD50)—the amount of 
a dose administered that would kill half the test population—for humans with pulmonary 
anthrax is 8,000 to 10,000 spores.53 To get a better sense of anthrax’s virulence, it is 
important to note that it takes roughly 2,500 spores to become infected with pulmonary 
anthrax, and a lethal dose of 10,000 spores can be inhaled in one breath.54 For some 
people, such as elderly people or those whose immune systems are already weakened by 
pre-existing infections, the number of spores required for infection can be much lower.55 
With pulmonary anthrax, death is universal in untreated cases and may occur in as many 
as 95 percent of treated cases if therapy is begun more than forty-eight hours after the 
onset of symptoms.56 
Anthrax was a major component of many states’ past offensive biological warfare 
programs.57 Many of these programs concentrated on developing extremely virulent 
strains of treatment-resistant anthrax in order to maximize its effects.58 Combining the 
data of anthrax virulence with the estimated infectivity levels that a terrorist could use to 
maximize the number of deaths in a given population, one can see that if one kilogram of 
weaponized aerosolized anthrax contains approximately one trillion spores, and only 
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8,000 to 10,000 spores per person are required to kill half the population in a given area 
(LD50), the scenarios involving terrorists releasing upward of fifty kilograms of 
aerosolized anthrax present mind-numbing scenarios of death and destruction. 
4. Anthrax Incubation Period 
Anthrax spores have an amazing survival capacity, and are markedly resistant to 
biological extremes like heat, cold, pH, desiccation, chemicals (and thus to disinfection), 
irradiation, and other adverse conditions.59 Anthrax has been known to survive, deep in 
frozen bits of earth, for as long as seventy years.60 
The incubation period of anthrax in a susceptible host ranges from thirty-six to 
seventy-two hours, and usually progresses into its debilitating phases without any prior 
discernable symptoms.61 With pulmonary anthrax, the incubation period occurs after a 
period of one to six days.62 The incubation period as an indicator is one of the major 
epidemiologic factors that can lead to the successful attribution of a BW attack because, 
if extrapolated, an epidemic curve can be created. The disease pattern is an important 
factor in differentiating between a natural outbreak and an intentional attack, and can 
usually discern when and where each victim first became ill.63 However, in some cases, 
simply identifying where a victim contracted a disease does not present enough evidence 
to determine who it was that released the disease. 
E. CONCLUSION 
 This chapter assesses the vital importance of disease epidemiology on the 
successful attribution of a biological weapons attack. The five vital epidemiological 
characteristics that are necessary to study for any agent suspected in a BW attack are: 
pathogenicity, infectivity, virulence, and incubation period. If any investigation of the  
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suspected use of BW is undertaken and any one of these biological thumb prints is 
overlooked or miscalculated, the source of the attack could quite possibly never be 
attributed. 
By analyzing one agent—anthrax—in detail, this chapter shows how complicated 
each epidemiological characteristic can be, and how important each characteristic is both 




III.  SVERDLOVSK AND AMERITHRAX: EPIDEMIOLOGY OF 
TWO ANTHRAX OUTBREAKS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This thesis uses the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak in the former Soviet Union, 
as well as the deliberate use of anthrax as a biological weapon in the 2001 “Amerithrax” 
outbreak in the United States as two juxtaposed case studies to analyze the actual 
complications of the attribution of a biological weapons agent. Chapter III analyzes the 
complications of the particular epidemiology of the Sverdlovsk and Amerithrax anthrax 
outbreaks, using the chapter’s previously presented and analyzed epidemiologic facts and 
details about anthrax to discern how and why it took over twelve years to concretely 
attribute the actual source of the anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk, USSR, and why the use 
of anthrax as a biological weapon in the 2001 Amerithrax crimes remains unsolved. 
B. SVERDLOVSK 
The Sverdlovsk case study shows, it was, effectively, the fabrication of anthrax’s 
epidemiological characteristics that prevented the proper attribution of the Sverdlovsk 
outbreak. Because the Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak occurred in 1979, when the USSR 
was a closed, hostile society, making an international investigation of the incident 
impossible, epidemiology was the only tool Western scientists had to determine the 
source of the Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak. 
Anthrax is endemic to all regions of Russia, and natural outbreaks of the disease 
remain common today. In the past, czarist Russia and the former Soviet Union had 
among the world’s highest levels of recorded anthrax outbreaks.64 However, in April of 
1979, an anthrax outbreak occurred in what was then Sverdlovsk, USSR (now 
Yekaterinberg)65, that was so sudden and virulent, many people suspected that the 
outbreak was not natural in any way.  
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Toward the end of the 1970s, despite the Soviets Union’s public support and 
ratification of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the West had 
long doubted the sincerity of the Soviets declaration to end its offensive biological 
weapons program. In fact, by 1980, Western intelligence circles had begun to hear 
rumors of an outbreak of disease that had claimed hundreds, possibly thousands of 
victims. According to declassified, U.S. intelligence reports, 
A source reported that in late May 1979, a persistent rumor heard on the 
streets of Moscow was that some sort of disaster had occurred in 
Sverdlovsk earlier in the month. Several hundred people had died from an 
unknown cause. Authorities in Sverdlovsk first thought diseased cattle in 
the area… had caused the deaths. Later investigations… indicated that… 
an airborne disease may have been the true culprit.66 
At first, not only were Western governments unsure of what disease caused the 
outbreak in Sverdlovsk, but medical personnel on the ground in the area accompanying 
the emergency transport vehicles were incorrectly and prematurely making an initial 
diagnosis of pneumonia.67 Soon after the outbreak, however, the hospitals treating the 
outbreak patients were taken over by the military and completely sealed off from the 
public, and Soviet health officials descended on Sverdlovsk to control not only the 
outbreak, but rumors as to its origins.68 As more people fell ill, and as the victims’ 
symptoms began to look less like pneumonia, many doctors and common citizens alike 
began to suspect that a virulent anthrax epidemic had overtaken Sverdlovsk. But where 
had the victims of this deadly disease come into contact with the bacteria? The public 
officials and the Soviet government had one explanation, while the doctors treating the 
patients, common citizens of Sverdlovsk, and Western intelligence circles had another 
explanation. 
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1. Sverdlovsk Pathogenicity 
a. Governments Report: The Bad Meat Theory—An Outbreak of 
Gastrointestinal Anthrax 
After the outbreak, the Soviet government released official reports stating 
that the anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk had been the result of tainted meat being sold in 
the regions surrounding the city. Dr. Pyotr Burgasov, the Soviet Deputy Minister of 
Health and the official in charge of the public health response to the epidemic offered two 
pieces of evidence to support this theory: veterinary and pathological evidence.69 
Burgasov insisted that, supporting the veterinary evidence, an epizootic, natural outbreak 
of anthrax had occurred in sheep and cattle in April of 1979, and this tainted meat was the 
source of human illness. Additionally, Burgasov cited that autopsies performed on 
victims of the outbreak demonstrated disease in the gastrointestinal tract, particularly in 
the small intestine.70 Burgasov insisted this pathological and epidemiological evidence 
was indicative of a food-borne epidemic from tainted meat which had been improperly 
processed, handled, cooked, and illegally sold.71 
The Soviet government’s tainted meat theory as the pathogenesis of the 
anthrax epidemic was not too far fetched; since the 1970s, the black market economy in 
Russia accounted for as much as 20 percent of national output, and many Russian people 
acquired food, especially farm products, from nonofficial sources.72 These 
undocumented, unregulated food distribution channels were often found to be the source 
of many food-borne illnesses, and had—in the past—been identified as the source of 
anthrax infected meat that subsequently infected local populations. Many Soviet 
government officials insisted that anyone suggesting that the anthrax outbreak was 
anything other gastrointestinal was, in fact, just spreading malicious propaganda. 
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A March 1980 Tass article entitled, “A Germ of Lying,” advanced the 
Soviet argument that a natural outbreak of anthrax had occurred among some of the 
livestock in the Sverdlovsk area, and condemned the U.S. accusations of the release of a 
BW agent as part of a plan for spurring the arms race, intensifying tensions, and waging 
psychological warfare against the USSR.73 Despite these official publications and 
statements, however, many people—in the political and medical communities inside and 
outside the USSR—were skeptical that the official pathogenesis of the anthrax outbreak 
was, in fact, gastrointestinal. 
b. Real Report: Biological Weapons Incident—An Outbreak of 
Pulmonary Anthrax 
As the full scope of the outbreak began to emerge, a gastrointestinal 
outbreak of anthrax from infected meat seemed to be less probable. Many people began 
to suspect that the epidemic, in fact, possessed an entirely different pathogenicity than 
what was being claimed: a pathogenicity that was much more virulent and deadly than 
gastrointestinal anthrax. Most people agreed the disease in question was, in fact, anthrax. 
The controversy, however, was over the actual pathogenesis of the outbreak. 
The initial evidence of a pulmonary anthrax outbreak was discovered by 
the same pathologists whose work Burgasov cited as evidence of a gastrointestinal 
outbreak. Faina A. Abramova, a pathologist working in one of the Sverdlovsk hospitals 
where victims of the epidemic were being treated, managed to hide her notes, 
microscopic slides, and tissue samples from the KGB, who removed and destroyed the 
hospital records of the patients affected by the anthrax outbreak; the Soviet government 
refused to support, and attempted to destroy all epidemiological evidence, that would 
implicate an aerosolized release of anthrax. Abramova’s medical notes remain some of 
the only remaining original copies of medical observations of the outbreak patients that  
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are still in existence.74 Abramova’s notes indicated severe hemorrhagic meningitis in a 
patient who died on approximately the sixth day of the epidemic.75 The notes detailed 
that 
All forty two cases were characterized by the most prominent and 
consistent lesions of hemorrhagic thoracic lymphadenitis and hemorrhagic 
mediastinitis... The pulmonary portal of entry was further emphasized by 
the presence of a primary anthrax pulmonary focus—focal hemorrhagic, 
necrotizing anthrax pneumonia in eleven patients.76 
Despite the existence of disease in the victims’ gastrointestinal tracts, 
Abramova and other doctors treating victims began to take note of symptoms that were 
asymptomatic to gastrointestinal anthrax. Though other forms of anthrax infection were 
rare, Abramova and others believed that the pathogenesis of the anthrax infections was 
pulmonary anthrax.  
2. Sverdlovsk Anthrax Infectivity  
In addition to clues on the Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak’s pathogenicity, by 
understanding the details of any agent’s infectivity levels, and grasping the details of the 
infectivity levels of anthrax, vital epidemiological clues about the anthrax outbreak at 
Sverdlovsk were deciphered. 
The Sverdlovsk epidemic’s vital statistics—detailing the actual total number of 
cases, case fatality rate, and incubation period—were revised and debated for years, as a 
direct result of a prolonged KGB cover-up of the outbreak.77 As a result, no actual data 
on the infectivity levels of the anthrax that was released in Sverdlovsk is known to exist. 
However, the amount of anthrax released in the outbreak was estimated at seventy 
kilograms (154.32 pounds), and that amount could infect the occupants of a region 
spanning tens of thousands of square miles.78 
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The details of the Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak’s infectivity levels will be 
discussed more at length when the incubation period of the Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak 
is discussed below. 
3. Sverdlovsk Anthrax Virulence 
Another epidemiological characteristic that led to the proper attribution of the 
Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak was the outbreak’s virulence. Published reports on the 
epidemic’s vital statistics and case fatality rates have varied. Some reports suggest that 
there may have been as many as 250 cases, with 100 deaths, while others claim that 358 
people became ill with forty-five deaths.79 Despite the inconsistencies, the most widely 
accepted reports state that sixty-four people died and ninety-six people were infected. 
These smaller figures, alone, would have tripled the USSR’s yearly average morbidity 
from anthrax and pushed its death rate off the chart. 80 The fact that this outbreak would 
have been exceptionally more virulent than most other anthrax outbreaks in 
contemporary Sverdlovsk history, was a major red flag that the epidemic was, in fact, not 
a natural outbreak from infected meat. Before coming clean, the Soviet government, in 
fact, did not have an official explanation for why the number of victims in the 1979 
outbreak was exceptionally high. They continued, however, to advance their official lie 
that the source of the attack was merely infected meat. 
4. Sverdlovsk Incubation Period 
As stated earlier in this chapter, it is often the incubation period that provides the 
most solid forensic evidence that ultimately leads to a successful attribution of an 
outbreak or potential attack. In the Sverdlovsk outbreak, it was the epidemiological 
characteristic of the incubation period of aerosolized anthrax that eventually provided 
enough evidence to unearth the truth about what happened to the sixty-four people that 
died in Sverdlovsk in April and May of 1979. 
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One can usually find that a plot of the incubation period for persons exposed at 
the same time follows a normal log distribution, and times and places of infection for 
each casualty can be reliably deduced. The series of forty-two autopsies in the Sverdlovsk 
cases demonstrated a striking illness affecting previously healthy persons, who died 
usually one to four days after infection.81 Most importantly, however, after enough hard 
data was able to be collected, a very telltale pattern began to emerge that detailed exactly 
when and where each victim of the outbreak must have come in contact with the 
aerosolized bacteria. Such spot maps, retroactively pinpointing the location where each 
victim fell ill, is an integral part of all BW attribution investigations. According to reports 
collected from American scientists after visiting Sverdlovsk in 1991, 
We have now circumscribed the time of common exposure to anthrax. The 
number of red dots we can plot on our spot map places nearly all of the 
victims within a narrow plume that stretches southeast from Compound 19 
to the neighborhood past the ceramics factory…What we know proves a 
lethal plume of anthrax came from Compound 19 (See Image 2 (a) and 
2(b)).82 
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  (4A)      (4B) 
Image 2. (A) Probable locations in Sverdlovsk of where victims of the anthrax 
outbreak were first exposed to the bacteria. (B) Villages in and around 
Sverdlovsk that had developed animal anthrax cases in April 1979.83 
 
 The spot map, coupled with scientific data on the wind patterns during the 
suspected beginnings of the outbreak from 2 to 6 April 1979, detail the vital need to 
understand an agent’s epidemiological characteristics; the epidemiological data, depicted 
above on the dot maps, show that victims of the Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak lived and/or 
worked in a narrow zone extending from a mysterious military facility—Compound 19—
to the southern city limit.84  
 After many other developments—which will be discussed in subsequent 
chapters—and over twelve years of political accusations and lies, it was the 
epidemiological evidence of the Sverdlovsk anthrax’s incubation period, as well as other 
epidemiological details of aerosolized anthrax, that eventually led to the proper 
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attribution of the Sverdlovsk outbreak. Despite the probability that the United States, 
using other sources of information, knew the true source of the Sverdlovsk outbreak, due 
to the inability to investigate inside the USSR, the United States could not officially 
declare the true source of the anthrax outbreak. It took the fall of the Soviet Union and 
twelve years of time between the beginning of the epidemic and the proper attribution of 
its source. However, armed with hard, epidemiological facts, and dots maps that showed 
when and where each victim fell ill and on exactly what date symptoms began to develop, 
Western scientists were able to pinpoint the source of the anthrax outbreak and concretely 
attributed it to the accidental escape of an aerosol of anthrax pathogen from the military 
facility, Compound 19, in Sverdlovsk, USSR.85 With evidence this conclusive, the Soviet 
government was—over time—forced to admit there was a deadly anthrax outbreak in 
Sverdlovsk, giving the rest of the world more insight into the Soviet’s secretive biological 
weapons program.86  
 Because an international investigation was impossible in 1979 due to the political 
hostilities between the United States and the USSR, the Sverdlovsk case study 
emphasizes the essential role of epidemiology in pin-pointing the location and magnitude 
of a BW outbreak when there cannot be direct access to a BW release location. Using 
forensic epidemiology, Western scientists and governments were able to study, analyze, 
and attribute the Sverdlovsk evidence over ten years after the accident at Compound 19. 
Forensic epidemiology, therefore, is a critical tool for all BW investigations, and is a key 
component to the attribute of a BW release. 
C. AMERITHRAX 
The American anthrax outbreak in the fall of 2001 epitomizes both the necessity 
as well as the limits of sophisticated epidemiological studies in modern BW outbreak 
investigations. This case study emphasizes how epidemiology can help reveal essential 
forensic evidence in a BW investigation, but also how there is still much to be learned in 
the fields of forensic microbiology and epidemiology. The American anthrax 
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investigation quickly revealed the weaknesses in contemporary forensic epidemiology as 
applied to BW investigations, and though the investigation uncovered a large amount of 
evidence, the epidemiological clues discovered during the investigation could only take 
the investigation so far. As the case remains unsolved to date, this case study shows both 
the strengths and the pitfalls of having to rely on epidemiological evidence to solve a BW 
attack. 
In the weeks following the September 11th terrorist attacks, between early October 
and late November 2001, there was a bioterrorist attack on the United States that ran a 
destructive course, infecting twenty-two people with both cutaneous and pulmonary 
forms of anthrax, and leaving five people dead.87 After multiple anthrax-infested letters 
were sent through the U.S. Postal System (USPS) to addresses in New York, 
Washington D.C., and Florida, an already distraught and emotionally exhausted public 
frantically sought medical help and advice from federal and state agencies, and 
desperately sought an answer as to who was responsible. Sadly, over five years have 
passed and what has now become known as the “Amerithrax” case remains unsolved. 
 Despite this sobering fact, the role of epidemiology played and continues to play 
an enormous role in the Amerithrax investigation. Like the Sverdlovsk case study over 
twenty years earlier, the role of epidemiology in the U.S. anthrax attacks assisted in 
narrowing the field of possible suspects and sources of the attack. 
1. Strain-Level Signatures of BW Agents 
An epidemiological characteristic that came to light in the Amerithrax case and 
not the Sverdlovsk case is that of strain-level signatures of BW agents. In biological 
agent species, both weaponized and natural, each separate species has its own identifying 
molecular marks, much like each individual has a family tree. If scientists are able to 
capture, analyze, and catalogue a particular species’ unique molecular marks, a database 
can be created that identifies each strain according to its unique characteristics. 
Scientists at The Center for Disease Control (CDC) and the United States Army 
Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) are among some of the 
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federal institutions that maintain scientific databases of potential biological weapons 
agents. These scientists know that each genus of bacteria has many species, and each 
species can have thousands of different types of strains.88 (See Figure 1). In modern BW 
investigations, knowledge of an agent’s strain can be the key to the eventual attribution of 
the attack. 
 
Figure 1.   Phylogenetic Tree89 
 
According to Bert Weinstein of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s 
Biology and Biotechnology Research Program (BBRP), 
Strains are a subset of a species, and their DNA may differ by about 0.1 
percent within the species. A species, in turn, is a member of a larger 
related group (genus), and its DNA may differ by a percent or so from that 
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determining the native origin of a pathogen associated with an outbreak; 
such information could help law enforcement identify the group or groups 
behind the attack.90 
 It is precisely this technology that assisted federal efforts in identifying the strain 
of anthrax that was used in the Amerithrax attacks. Interestingly enough, Bacillus 
anthracis has few detectable differences among its strains.91 There are, however, some 
very notable anthrax strains. For example, the anthrax strain used by the Japanese cult 
Aum Shinrikyo in Japan in 1993 is known to scientists around the world as the Sterne 
strain.92 Additionally, the strain of anthrax created in the offensive biological warfare 
program of the United States before its destruction in 1969 was known as the Vollum 
strain. And, in 1985, USAMRIID created and tested a wild-type strain of anthrax that 
became known as the Ames strain, which later become infamous in the Amerithrax 
attacks.93 
 It was the intricacies of BW agent epidemiology and the newly developed 
scientific data-basing of BW strains that exposed the frightening possibility that the 
perpetrator(s) of the Amerithrax attacks was not a foreign terrorist, but perhaps a well-
trained and educated scientist inside the United States. Early on in the investigation, after 
the federal government had classified the anthrax attacks as a criminal matter and not just 
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a natural isolated outbreak, scientists were able to test and analyze the strain of anthrax in 
the envelopes that had found their way to various location in Florida, New York, 
Washington D.C., and Capitol Hill. Much to the horror of the investigators involved, it 
was discovered that the anthrax-laced letters were filled with the Ames strain, a unique 
strain of anthrax used in U.S. military labs.94 Additionally, most experts believed that 
only about fifty people had both the access to and the knowledge of the Ames strain and 
how it could be weaponized.95 The list of possible suspects quickly turned inward, and 
U.S. federal prosecutors began to consider that the orchestrator of this act of bioterrorism 
on U.S. soil was, in fact, one of our own. The details of this investigation will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter IV. 
2. Amerithrax Pathogenicty 
 The Amerithrax anthrax attacks revealed a tremendous amount of information 
about the pathogenic nature of both cutaneous and pulmonary anthrax. Much of this 
information, unfortunately, was learned at the expense of human life. However, so few 
cases of pulmonary anthrax had ever occurred and had been studied in the twentieth 
century, that throughout the response effort, public health officials were quite 
forthcoming about the fact that they were facing a new situation and were learning about 
anthrax’s pathogenic nature as they went.96 During the outbreak, doctors, federal health 
authorities, and investigators learned how anthrax can actually enter and infect a host, 
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and this knowledge will undoubtedly assist the government to better prepare and protect 
the American public if another anthrax attack were to occur. 
 With multiple cases of anthrax appearing as result of anthrax-laced letters, 
immediate governmental and investigative response attention in the Amerithrax case was 
turned to the U.S. Postal Service (USPS). In fact, at the height of the outbreak, U.S. 
Postmaster General John Potter went to the U.S. Postal Service’s Brentwood facility, 
which unknowingly filtered and delivered a few of the anthrax-laced letters to their 
addressed destinations on Capital Hill, to try to assuage its 2,400 postal workers that their 
fears of being infected were very minimal. Potter and his executives had consulted with 
expert doctors at CDC, as well as the D.C. Department of Public Health, and the CDC's 
top infectious disease specialists had concluded that there was no reason to start the 
Brentwood employees on preventive antibiotics.97 Due to previously conceived 
understand about anthrax’s pathogenicity and past knowledge about how anthrax can 
actually travel and infect a host, the CDC felt that none of the USPS employees were at 
risk. According to a statement in mid-October 2001 by Deborah Willhite, USPS Senior 
Vice President for Government Relations and public policy, 
[The CDC] says there was virtually no risk of any anthrax contamination 
in the [Brentwood] facility, that without the letter being opened at 
Brentwood, there was no risk of any anthrax escaping, so neither the 
facility nor the employees needed to be tested [for anthrax exposure and/or 
infection].98 
 Unfortunately, it had never occurred to the USPS Board of Governors, nor the 
expert doctors at the CDC, that refined anthrax could actually seep through the pores of a 
standard envelope, potentially infecting not only the person who opened the envelope, but 
the hundreds of people who could have come in contact either with the letter itself, or 
even the bags used to carry and sort the letter, or even the giant postal sorting machines.99 
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The Amerithrax attack revealed to the CDC and the American public that, due to the 
pathogenic nature of powdered, aerosolized, and weaponized anthrax spores, a single 
anthrax-laden envelope possessed the possibility of infecting hundreds in its wake. 
 Ironically, scientists at DRDC Suffield, a Canadian government facility operated 
by Defense Research and Development Canada, had sent a September 2001 study to the 
CDC's Laboratory Response Network (LRN) on October 4, 2001, the day the first 
anthrax letter surfaced.100 The Canadian researchers tried to inform the CDC that their 
study had concluded that the aerosol released from an anthrax-laced envelope would 
quickly spread throughout a room so that many other workers, depending on their exact 
locations and the directional air flow within the office, would most likely inhale lethal 
doses of the bacteria. Additionally, envelopes with open corners not specifically sealed 
could pose a serious threat to those in the mail handling system.101 
 Both a USPS Service Center in Brentwood, as well as one in Trenton, New 
Jersey, had unknowingly handled, sorted, and delivered many of the anthrax-laced letters. 
As a result of the lack of government and medicinal understanding of the pathogenicity of 
anthrax, Thomas Morris Jr. and Joseph Curseen, two U.S. postal employees at the 
Brentwood facility, died of pulmonary anthrax. Hundreds of other postal workers tested 
positive for anthrax exposure, and some became infected with cutaneous forms of anthrax 
from handling infected mail. If federal authorities had had a better understanding of the 
pathogenic nature of aerosolized anthrax, these lives could have been saved, and the 
panic that erupted due to these letters could have been assuaged.  
3. Amerithrax Infectivity 
Once it was discovered that anthrax spores could actually seep through sealed 
envelopes and infect anyone who handled the envelope, the Amerithrax case uncovered 
another alarming lesson in epidemiology of BW agents: the frightening possibility of 
cross-contamination. Remembering that infectivity is the minimum number of infectious 
particles required to establish an infection, many federal and local authorities were 
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focusing on the mini-epicenters where anthrax-laced letters were surfacing for signs of 
infection—the Trenton and Brentwood U.S. Postal Service Centers; Senator Dacshle’s 
office in Washington D.C.; the AMI Media Company in Florida, etc. Authorities scoured 
buildings where letters were found, and tested all employees and people within the 
immediate vicinity of an infected letter, building, or an already infected person. 
As noted earlier in this chapter, it takes roughly 2,500 spores to become infected 
with pulmonary anthrax, and a lethal dose of 10,000 spores can be inhaled in one breath. 
Doctors and scientists had assumed a person must be exposed to a minimum number of 
spores in order to become infected, and an even higher concentration of spores in order to 
die from the bacteria. Before the Amerithrax case, what authorities were unprepared to 
confront was that for some victims of the attacks, the infectivity threshold for infection 
and/or death was much lower. The scientific understanding of the capabilities of 
weaponized anthrax was being redefined as the investigation waged on. Scientists and 
government experts were literally learning on the fly, and their previous understandings 
of weaponized anthrax and how it could infect a person was constantly changing over the 
course of the investigation as new details and evidence was being uncovered. 
In New York City, where anthrax-filled letters had reached the offices of ABC, 
CBS, and the New York Post—examples of merely a few of the places in New York City 
where anthrax traces were found—Kathy Nguyen, a sixty-one year old Vietnamese 
refugee, inexplicably became another victim of the anthrax letters. Nguyen lived alone in 
the Bronx, and worked at the Manhattan Eye, Ear, and Throat Hospital on the Upper East 
Side.102 She commuted to work every day on the New York City subway system, and her 
job stocking the operating and recovery rooms in the hospital did not involve opening 
mail. 
Nguyen’s case quickly emerged as everybody’s worst epidemiologic 
nightmare.103 She was not in any way connected to any of the previous victims of the 
anthrax attacks in New York City, and in no way had ever directly come in contact with 
any of the contaminated letters that had been sent to the city’s various media outlets. 
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After tests conducted by the CDC, Nguyen’s apartment yielded no sign of anthrax, and 
no spores were reported at her work place. It remains a complete mystery as to how and 
where Kathy Nguyen contracted the pulmonary anthrax bacteria that killed her. 
Equally as alarming, just days before Nguyen began displaying symptoms of 
pulmonary anthrax, a New Jersey women who worked as a bookkeeper for an accounting 
firm had been diagnosed with cutaneous anthrax.104 After a thorough inspection of the 
woman’s workplace, no traces of anthrax had been found. Additionally, in late November 
2001, a ninety-four year old Connecticut woman, Ottie Lundgren, became the second 
victim—after Nguyen—to inexplicably die from pulmonary anthrax. Dozens of samples 
from the postal facilities that handled Lundgren’s mail, samples from her mailbox, and 
eighteen samples taken from her house and garbage all turned up negative for the 
presence of anthrax.105 
Both Nguyen, Lundgren, and the New Jersey woman’s case illuminated two 
horrifying and previously unconsidered scenarios in the Amerithrax case: that the nascent 
path of anthrax infection had moved beyond media companies, government offices, and 
mail routes and on to ordinary citizens, and that due to varying factors, authorities must 
now plan for scenarios in which the infectivity thresholds of some citizens is much lower 
than doctors had originally calculated for the general population.106 It seemed thousands 
more were at risk of infection from anthrax than previously suspected. 
After Nguyen and Lundgren’s death, senior officials of the Department of Health 
and Human Services announced that some tens of thousands of letters processed through 
the U.S. Postal Service might have been contaminated with trace amounts of anthrax 
spores merely by coming into contact with intentionally poisoned mail.107 The scenario 
of cross-contaminated mail and unconnected victims falling ill revealed that the medical 
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and scientific communities had more to learn about the infectivity characteristics and 
behavior of anthrax. Kathy Nguyen in New York, Ottie Lundgren in Connecticut, and the 
New Jersey accountant had no known direct contact with any of the anthrax-filled letters. 
These three cases highlighted the fact while the LD50 for anthrax is 8,000 to 10,000 
spores, far lower levels of exposure may trigger an infection, especially in those with 
weakened immune systems.108 In these three cases, investigators had difficulty finding a 
large enough quantity of spores to cause infection, ultimately suggesting that the ages and 
conditions of the victims almost certainly made them more susceptible to infection 
through lower numbers of spores.  
 These three cases shed new light on the role of the epidemiological characteristic 
of infectivity on BW investigations, and made public health official and federal 
investigators aware of the fact that in BW outbreaks, literally thousands of ordinary 
citizens are at risk of becoming infected, regardless of how close they are to the 
epicenters of an attack. 
4. Amerithrax Virulence 
As noted above, it was discovered early on in the Amerithrax investigation that 
authorities—in all localities from New York to Washington D.C. to Florida—were  
dealing with a strain of anthrax that closely resembled the Ames strain. After this 
discovery, both the CDC and USAMRIID—through careful diagnostic testing—were 
able to determine that the strain of anthrax that was surfacing in envelopes throughout the 
United States had not, in fact, been genetically altered in any way. 
Although USAMRIID officials noted that the anthrax spores used in the 
Amerithrax envelopes had been weaponized, meaning the spores were modified from 
their liquid suspension form to a powdered, aerosolized form, the strain itself had not 
been genetically modified in any way.109 This discovery allowed investigators and 
medical officials to be confident that infections caused by this Ames strain of anthrax 
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were, in fact, treatable with antibiotics.110 As mentioned above when discussing the aims 
of the USSR’s covert biological warfare program, certain BW programs were able to 
genetically modify strains of certain viruses and bacteria to create chimera viruses that 
resist common vaccines and are much more virulent than the naturally occurring agent.111 
Other BW programs had developed a strategy for hiding deadly viral genes inside some 
milder bacterium's genome, so that medical treatment of a victim's initial symptoms from 
one microbe would trigger a second microbe's growth. The strain of anthrax that was 
being circulated throughout the U.S. Postal System, however, closely resembled the 
Ames strain of anthrax, and was responsive to the same treatments, antibiotics, and 
vaccines that U.S. biological weapons researchers had developed in the 1980s when the 
Ames strain was first introduced into the offensive BW arsenal of the United States. 
What this fact uncovered, therefore, was that although the strain of anthrax used 
in the Amerithrax attacks had perhaps been weaponized, its virulence was relatively low 
and predictable and responsive to treatment. In fact, the CDC reported that during the 
height of the outbreak, over 32,000 people had been prescribed antibiotics to guard 
against infection.112 The fact that the Amerithrax anthrax had a well-understood 
virulence, coupled with the action of health officials prescribing antibiotics to those 
potentially exposed to the anthrax, could very well be testament to the very low number 
of deaths in the Amerithrax outbreak. Had the virulence levels of the strain of anthrax 
used in the Amerithrax been genetically modified in any way to be resistant to common 
antibiotics and vaccines, the number of deaths could have been exponentially higher. 
Understanding BW virulence, therefore, is critical to understanding, containing, and 
saving lives in a BW outbreak. 
5. Amerithrax Incubation Period 
Unlike the Sverdlovsk case, the incubation periods of anthrax infections yielded 
few clues in the Amerithrax case. For many of the victims, scientific knowledge of 
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anthrax’s typical incubation periods—in both the cutaneous and pulmonaryal forms of 
the disease—gave authorities clues as to precisely when the victims contracted the 
disease, but yielded few insights as to where the victims came in contact with the 
bacteria. 
Juxtaposing the Sverdlovsk case with the Amerithrax case, the most alarming 
revelation is the role that modern globalization plays in contemporary BW outbreaks. 
With the transportation and mobilization of people and products occurring at an 
incredible rate, the Amerithrax case showed how a BW attack carried out through the 
U.S. Postal System could infect multiple people in multiple locations—wreaking havoc 
on local and federal authorities in multiple jurisdictions and causing mass panic in 
multiple cities—almost simultaneously. In fact, as has been well documented in the 
weeks surrounding the Amerithrax attacks, not only was domestic mail discovered with 
traces of a deadly BW agent, but mail around the world also began testing positive for 
anthrax.113 In what is the greatest irony—in light of the two cases being studied in this 
thesis—in early November 2001, U.S. officials at the consulate in Yekaterinburg, 
Russia—previously Sverdlovsk, the site of the 1979 anthrax outbreak—announced that a 
negligible amount of anthrax had been discovered on one of six mailbags delivered to the 
consulate on October 25, 2001, from Washington, D.C.114 The source of the anthrax was 
not established, although anthrax spores were found in the bag. 
In a matter of weeks, twenty two people—residing in more than four cities over 
1200 miles apart—had become victims of a BW attack.115 After five people lost their 
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lives from the Amerithrax attack, it become obvious that even with modern medical and 
scientific capabilities, successful BW attribution remains an incredibly perplexing 
problem. 
D. CONCLUSION 
 This chapter assesses the vital importance of disease epidemiology on the 
successful attribution of a biological weapons attack through the lens of the case study 
examinations of the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak and the 2001 Amerithrax 
outbreak. 
 By analyzing one agent—anthrax—in detail, this chapter shows how complicated 
each epidemiological characteristic can be, and how important each characteristic is both 
independently and when examined as details of an agent’s cohesive whole. Again, 
without a proper understanding of an agent’s epidemiological characteristics, an actor or 
government could quite possibly fabricate the source of an attack, and absolve 
themselves of guilt—just as the Soviet Union did in Sverdlovsk. By attempting to 
convince the world that the pathogenesis of the anthrax outbreak was from infected meat, 
the USSR was able to claim that the source of a catastrophic outbreak of disease to 
naturally occurring events; this method of reasoning and action can easily be replicated 
today. However, by thoroughly examining the specific epidemiology of aerosolized 
anthrax spores, scientists were eventually able to prove that the Soviet government had, 
although accidentally, released an onslaught of unnatural death and destruction onto its 
own unsuspecting population. 
 In the same light, the epidemiological characteristics of the anthrax used in the 
Amerithrax outbreak provided critical clues to the details of the chaotic events following 
9/11 and to a list of possible suspects. However, these epidemiological clues to date have 
not fully implicated a perpetrator. 
 If and when an attack occurs in which biological weapons are used, the sound 
analysis and understanding of disease epidemiology can successfully and expediently 
lead to the proper attribution of the attack, so that the perpetrator of the heinous crime can 
quickly face the international repercussions and consequences of such an abhorred and 
illegal action. Although epidemiology assisted in the eventual attribution of the 
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Sverdlovsk outbreak, as the Amerithrax case shows, epidemiology has its limits. The 
continued advancement of forensic epidemiology and microbiology is needed to make 
BW investigations more successful. Much has been learned about the epidemiological 
characteristics of many organisms, but the Amerithrax case shows that organisms do not 
always behave as predicted once they are produced in the form of a biological weapon. 
Scientists and government experts must continue to strengthen their understanding of the 
epidemiological capabilities of weaponized organisms so that—in the event of a BW 
outbreak—the investigation of the outbreak can both be safer and yield more evidence for 




IV.  THE IMPEDIMENTS TO BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 
ATTRIBUTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL 
ENVIRONMENTS 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Between March and July 1997, a devastating outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease 
(FMD) occurred in pigs in Taiwan. A total of 6,147 pig farms with more than 4 million 
pigs were infected, and 37.7 percent of the pigs in Taiwan either died (0.18 million pigs) 
or were killed (3.85 million pigs).116 The financial cost of the epidemic was estimated at 
US$378.6 million. Owing to the ban on exports of pork to Japan, it is estimated that the 
total economic cost to Taiwan's pig industry was about US$1.6 billion. Subsequent 
epidemiological testing on the strain of foot and mouth disease infecting the Taiwanese 
pigs revealed that the same strain of virus is present in China, leading to speculation that 
it was carried in with piglets or pork brought into Taiwan from China.117 
In February 2005, a fast-moving case of pneumonic plague broke out in a small 
village in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The plague spread so quickly 
that the World Health Organization (WHO) was called to assist in containing the 
epidemic. Bubonic plague is endemic in parts of Africa, including the DRC, but 
pneumonic plague—which is spread by human to human contact when the disease 
mutates to be airborne—occurs when the bacteria infects the lung, has a very high fatality 
rate and is deadly when left untreated, according to the WHO. The combination of the 
nature of the disease, as well as the remote location of the outbreak, caused quite an 
alarm for the WHO since this particular outbreak occurred in an unidentified northern 
mining town ravaged by conflict and cut off from humanitarian aid.118 Additionally, in 
June 2006, another epidemic of pneumonic plague spread through the DRC, killing over 
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100 people.119 The WHO was called in to contain the epidemic, but officials have 
reported that control measures have been difficult to implement because of security 
concerns in the area. 
In May 2006, health officials working in a remote and isolated village in 
Indonesia documented what they suspected as being the fourth cluster of person-to-
person avian bird flu cases since the epidemic had begun in March of 2003.120 In three 
years, bird flu spread to over forty countries, affecting Western and Eastern Europe, the 




Figure 2.   Nations With Confirmed Cases of H5N1 Avian Influenza (May 19, 
2006).121 
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What do these three cases have in common? The pigs in Taiwan, the plague in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the bird flu spreading like wild-fire across the 
globe all highlight the intrinsic difficulties in identifying, containing, and attributing the 
source of a disease outbreak in an international environment. Natural disease outbreaks 
know no boundaries, but the organizations that monitor and investigate disease outbreaks 
certainly have limitations when it comes to navigating fickle international political 
environments. The FMD outbreak in Taiwan, for example, was wrought with very 
serious political accusations that China intentionally may have infected the Taiwanese 
pigs. Not only did the Taiwanese authorities have to contain the FMD epidemic, but a 
criminal investigation took place to attempt to attribute the source of the disease outbreak 
to a man-made source. This investigation highlights two very crucial points about 
biological weapons attribution. First, not only can BW cause tremendous harm to 
humans, but also to plants and animals. Secondly, the consequences of BW use cannot 
simply be quantified in numbers of sick or killed; BW use can have tremendous 
economic and political impacts, as well.  
 The plague outbreak in DRC highlights the difficulties for world health bodies to 
intervene, quarantine, and eradicate naturally occurring diseases in isolated, conflict-
ravaged areas of the world. It also reveals how vulnerable these same areas would be if a 
BW agent was released on an unsuspecting population. Not only would it be difficult for 
health authorities to determine whether an outbreak was natural or unnatural in the 
isolated villages in DRC, but it is quite possible that local governments and authorities 
would be hostile to any outside intervention in their sovereign territories. 
The bird flu pandemic represents the weaknesses in cross-border quarantines. Even if 
the WHO and other international organizations can track outbreaks and suggest to local 
authorities how to contain and/or eradicate diseases from certain areas, the inability for 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the WHO to legislate and enforce 






This chapter highlights the extreme difficulties U.S. and world authorities face 
when attempting to attribute the intentional use of a biological weapon in a foreign 
territory. In essence, the ability to successfully attribute an international BW attack comes 
down to two things: law and politics. This chapter delves deeply into the nuances of both 
and their effects on BW attribution.  
Distinguishing between a natural and an unnatural outbreak can sometimes be an 
enormous undertaking due to epidemiological complexities as well as domestic 
jurisdictional restrictions. Disease outbreaks at an international level, however, combine 
the hurdles of epidemiological analysis and domestic restraints, and combines them with 
the at times incredibly restrictive effects of international political environments. Due to 
the intrinsic weaknesses in the major treaty governing biological weapons, the Biological 
and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the international community has very little 
legal ability to overtly investigate and therefore attribute an unnatural outbreak of 
disease. This chapter discusses at length the weaknesses of the BTWC and how the lack 
of a verification protocol significantly impacts the ability to attribute BW outbreaks. 
Additionally, this chapter discusses how the burden of proof is on a crippled international 
community when it comes to criminal investigations of BW use. It highlights the tools 
the international community possesses when it comes to international BW investigations, 
and detail the capabilities the international community lacks in international BW 
investigations. Next, this chapter discusses the impact of international politics, and the 
paralyzing affect states’ conflicts of interest can have on international BW investigations 
and attribution. Aside from the epidemiological difficulties of investigating and 
attributing an unnatural outbreak of disease, in the end, the absence of strong legal 
mechanisms, as well as fickle international politics, may be the biggest attribution hurdles 
for the international community in international BW outbreaks. Lastly, this chapter 
addresses the Sverdlovsk case study to assess the international impediments to 




B. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS TO BW ATTRIBUTION  
1. Weaknesses of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
The 1972 BTWC is the most important international tool against the use and 
development of biological weapons (BW). The BTWC is, by no means, however, a 
flawless treaty, and many of its weaknesses severely limit the ability to successfully 
attribute a BW attack. A flaw in the treaty is that no where within its fifteen articles is the 
actual use of biological weapons ever explicitly outlawed. The treaty only explicitly bans 
the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, and retention of biological and 
toxin weapons; the treaty simply implicitly bans the actual use of biological weapons.122 
Since its entry into force in 1975 there have been confirmed cases in which states 
have breached the Convention and several unconfirmed allegations of states maintaining 
offensive biological warfare programs.123 This has resulted in increased calls from the 
international community to equip the members of the convention with instruments to 
verify and enforce compliance of the convention’s mandates. To date, however, efforts to 
strengthen the BTWC by means of a supplementary legally-binding protocol have 
failed.124 As a result, the very treaty that was put into force over thirty years ago to aid 
and protect the international community from biological weapons development now 
serves as one of the largest international impediments to the successful attribution of BW 
use in a foreign territory. 
a. Article Four Weakness: Lack of Verification of Treaty 
Compliance 
One of the biggest weaknesses of the BTWC, which significantly impacts 
the ability to successfully attribute BW use, is the treaty’s lack of any binding verification 
                                                 
122 Although the BTWC does not explicitly outlaw the use of biological weapons, the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol does explicitly outlaw the use of BW. Although the Geneva Protocol was signed in 1925 and 
entered into force in 1928, the United States did not ratify the Protocol until 1975. See Milton Leitenberg, 
The Problem with Biological Weapons (Stockholm: The Swedish National Defense College, 2004), 68. 
123 The Secretary General of the UN has launched investigations into the alleged offensive BW 
production and/or use in Afghanistan and Indochina (1981 and 1982); Iran (1984-186, 1988); Iran and Iraq 
(1986); Iraq (1988 and 2002); Mozambique and Azerbaijan (1992). There have also been unconfirmed 
reports that Israel maintains an offensive biological warfare program. 
124 See also Chapter IV of this thesis for more information on the U.S. role in implementing 
additional BTWC Protocols. 
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measures. At four pages, it is astonishing to think that the BTWC was the first 
international agreement since World War II that banned the possession of an entire class 
of weapons.125 The brevity of the document, however, reflects the incredibly intense 
political environment in which it was created in 1970. With the Cold War in full swing, 
the BTWC’s provisions for verification were purposely written very weakly to assuage 
the Soviet Union. Many Western authorities in the international community at the time 
felt it would be better to have some sort of treaty against the use of biological weapons 
than no treaty at all. These same authorities knew, however, that no treaty covering a 
major WMD would be worth the paper it was written on if the Soviets did not sign on. As 
a result, the rigidity and effectiveness of the treaty’s protocols were compromised to 
reach an initial consensus. Thirty years later, however, those compromises have proven to 
all but cripple the mandates in the BTWC. 
(1) Legal Short-comings of Weak International Treaties and 
their Impact of BW Attribution.  Article Four of the BTWC insists that each nation must 
police its own country to ensure treaty compliance.126 State parties are required by 
Article Four to adopt any national measures necessary, in accordance with their 
constitutional processes, to prohibit and prevent the banned activities detailed in Article I 
of the treaty. The treaty does not prescribe the type of measures that should be adopted, 
although Article Four provides that such measures must be adopted in accordance with 
the state’s constitutional process, which usually dictate how international law obligations 
are incorporated into national law.127 
As is well known, there are many types of legal systems 
throughout the international community. According to the BioWeapons Report of 2004, 
Differences have emerged with regard to practice between states with a 
common law tradition and those with a civil law tradition. Common law 
states require national legislation to transform international obligations 
into enforceable national law. States parties with a common law tradition 
have generally determined that the Article FOUR obligation to put in 
                                                 
125 Mangold, Tom and Goldberg, Jeff Plague Wars (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1999), 59. 
126 Mangold, Plague Wars, 59. 
127 Bio Weapons Prevention Project (BWPP), BioWeapons Report 2004, 14. Accessible at: 
http://www.bwpp.org/documents/2004BWRFinal_000.pdf.  Accessed on December 12, 2005. 
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place national measures to ‘prohibit and prevent’ violations of the treaty’s 
core prohibitions requires the enactment of legislation and, specifically, 
penal legislation that details offences and establishes appropriate penalties 
for activities banned under Article I. States with a civil law tradition, 
however, may consider treaties they have joined as self-executing,  
whereby the text of the accord is automatically incorporated into national 
law when the agreement enters into force—no additional national 
measures are necessary to give it effect.128 
A significant problem emerges, therefore, when one realizes that—
because the original architects of the treaty wanted it to remain ambiguous in its 
implementation measures so that the Soviets would sign on—Article Four does not 
specify criminal offenses or define the nature of punishments if the treaty is violated. 
Therefore, civil law states will not be able to effectively enforce all BTWC obligations in 
their respective national jurisdictions without specific implementing legislation. While 
violations of the prohibition against the use of biological and toxin weapons might be 
capable of prosecution under states’ laws against manslaughter or murder, the related 
offences of development, production, stockpiling and transfer of such weapons might not 
be available in states’ penal codes, leaving the state unable to prosecute and punish 
alleged offenders.129   
In the United States and its common law systems, for example, 
additional laws and federal statues had to be passed in order to make any threatened use 
of a disease causing organism directed at humans, animals, or plants a crime.130 In 
addition, as a result of a change in the Bioterrorism Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act 
contained in the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and codified in Title18 USC §175(b), 
knowingly possessing a biological agent, toxin, or delivery system which cannot be 
justified as prophylactic, bona fide research, or other peaceful purpose can result in arrest, 
prosecution, and fines and/or imprisonment for up to ten years. This new provision shifts 
the burden of proof onto the person or persons who are in possession of dangerous 
biological agents to prove they have the material for legitimate purposes. Despite the 
                                                 
128 BioWeapons Report 2004, ibid.  
129 BioWeapons Report 2004, 15. 
130 Title 18, U.S.C. § 2332[a]. 
 60
gains the United States made in passing such laws, in accordance with the commitments 
made when the United States signed and ratified the BWTC in March of 1975, it is 
discouraging to realize that twenty-six years and a major biological weapons attack on 
U.S. soil had to first occur before the United States took the BTWCs mandates as just 
that—mandates. Many other state signatories of the BWTC have yet to adopt additional 
domestic legislation to ensure the Convention’s mandates are upheld. 
The short-comings of the BTWC creates numerous problems in the 
international environment, and not only drastically reduce the international community’s 
legal and technical ability to attribute a BW attack, but also reduces states’ capabilities of 
credibly deterring BW use by a state or non-state actor. Thirty years after the adoption of 
the BTWC, some state parties have yet to adopt national criminal legislation to ensure 
that the BTWC mandates are being effectively carried out and followed within their own 
sovereign territories.  
b. Article Six Weakness: Provides Incentive to Cheat 
Article Six of the BTWC states that any nation that suspects another 
nation of breaking its treaty obligations can submit a formal complaint with the United 
Nations. Any accused nation is supposed to allow the UN to investigate any allegations 
of noncompliance. However, the BTWC provides no formal procedures, reporting 
requirements, or recommended sanctions and/or punishments in the instance that a state 
is suspected of being in violation of the treaty. Article Six, therefore, is a completely 
meaningless sanction.131 The BTWC lacks any substantial checks and balances; state 
signatories know that renegade states have an incentive to cheat and ignore their treaty 
obligations because of the extremely high burden of proof any country or international 
body would face in attempting to prove and attribute the use of a BW agent. And as the 
introduction to this chapter highlights, outbreak of diseases occur frequently around the 
globe, and at times it can be extremely difficult to discern between a natural and an 
unnatural outbreak of disease. The weaknesses in the treaty create what some state 
                                                 
131 Mangold, Plague Wars, 59. Article Six expressly states that a formal complaint can be lodged with 
the Security Council of the UN, and an investigation can take place “in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations.” 
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signatories feel is an ability to cheat under the cover of the treaty. Proof of this ability to 
cheat are the numerous countries suspected of maintaining an offensive BW program, 
even after becoming signatories of the BTWC, including but not limited to: Iraq, South 
Africa, and Russia.  
Attribution will remain an extremely difficult step in international BW 
investigations if international protocols, legislations, and treaties are not significantly 
overhauled and enforced. As will be discussed below, without the legal structure in place 
for an international investigation to take place, the chances of successfully attributing a 
BW attack significantly decreases. Additionally, even if a state or an international body 
were to be able to accurately attribute an international BW incident, without the proper 
international legal mechanisms and protocols in place, those responsible for the use of 
biological weapons cannot be held accountable. As shown in Chapter I, if state or non-
state actors know that they can acquire and use BW without fear of identification or 
reprisal, they—and other—states will continue to proliferate, acquire, and use BW; no 
actor will be deterred from such behavior because there is no fear of truly being caught. 
2. International Community’s Burden of Proof 
As detailed in the introduction to this chapter, investigations of natural infectious 
disease outbreaks are very common, and the results of such investigations are often 
published. Despite this, however, surprisingly little has been written about the actual 
procedures followed during such domestic and international public health investigations. 
Most epidemiologists and public health officials learn the procedures of investigating 
natural disease outbreaks by conducting investigations with the initial assistance of more 
experienced colleagues.132 Natural health outbreak investigations involving public health 
officials usually follow an inductive approach, with overall evidence being held to a 
standard of scientific peer review, and findings being published in scientific journals. 
Additionally, must public health disease investigations focus on environmental sampling 
of disease outbreaks, rather than forensic sampling of crime scenes were a disease 
                                                 
132 Arthur Reingold, “Outbreak Investigations: A Perspective,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 4, no. 1 
(January-March 1998). 
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outbreak of a weaponized agent has occurred. The stark contrasts between these two 
types of investigations will be discussed more in Chapter V. 
Perhaps one of the most difficult hurdles the international community faces when 
attempting to attribute the release of a biological weapons agent is the legal and technical 
issue of burden of proof. Not only must public health officials be involved in unnatural 
outbreaks, but law enforcement officials must also be heavily involved in the 
investigations of a suspected BW outbreak. BW investigations must take a deductive 
approach, and all work of law enforcement investigations must be held to very stringent 
legal standards of evidence that will meet constitutional standards and withstand legal 
challenges to obtain a conviction.133 
In domestic BW investigations, a uniform set of laboratory protocols, based on 
established procedures and reagents, facilitates the introduction of test results into a court 
of law, thereby limiting evidentiary challenges that may result from the use of different 
testing methods or analyses.134 The differing nature of the investigatory work and 
standards to which domestic BW investigations are held, however, can pose difficulties 
when local public health and law enforcement officials conduct joint investigations. 
Overcoming the challenges of competing domestic jurisdictions, law enforcement, and 
public health agencies has proven tough enough within the United States during 
outbreaks like the Amerithrax attacks in 2001, as will be discussed in Chapter V. One can 
imagine, therefore, how these jurisdictional difficulties are immensely compounded when 
an unnatural disease outbreak occurs, and an investigation must take place at an 
international level. 
3. International Investigations 
Unlike domestic BW investigations, the international community lacks a 
uniformed set of laboratory standards, significantly hindering the international 
                                                 
133 Butler, “Collaboration Between Public Health and Law Enforcement: New Paradigms and 
Partnerships for Bioterrorism Planning and Response,” 1154. The concept of burden of proof and standards 
of evidence in a BW attack, however is hotly contested and varies greatly between domestic policy and 
forensic communities. Please see Chapter V for more information on this subject. 
134 Butler, “Collaboration Between Public Health and Law Enforcement: New Paradigms and 
Partnerships for Bioterrorism Planning and Response,” 1154. 
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community’s ability to limit evidentiary challenges that may result from the use of 
different testing methods of BW evidence.135 As discussed earlier in this chapter, the 
BWTC—particularly Article Six—lacks any credible investigatory mandates, and 
provides little assurance that if a member state is accused of cheating, a thorough and 
credible investigation can take place, either proving or absolving the member state of its 
guilt. The inability for member states of the BWTC to investigate and attribute 
international BW incidents undermines the deterrent value of the BTWC, and BW arms 
control in general. 
In lights of these sobering facts, what options does the international community 
have if it suspects a country of using BW? Since the BTWC was brought into force, there 
have been multiple international allegations of treaty violations that have launched both 
unilateral and multilateral international investigations. At present, there are four 
international mechanisms for investigating alleged BTWC noncompliance: (1) adversary 
investigations; (2) consultative meetings with other BTWC member states; (3) UN 
General Assembly investigations; and (4) Security Council meetings pursuant with the 
auspices of the BTWC.136   
a. The Adversary Approach 
Adversary investigations occur when one country directly accuses another 
country of noncompliance, and the accusing country conducts its own investigation of the 
breach. This approach, however, is riddled with problems, and rarely leads to the 
successful, unanimous attribution of a BW incident.137 Because the investigating country 
                                                 
135 Although no world-wide standard for laboratory standards and BW evidence collection currently 
exists, the Laboratory Response Network (LRN), created in 1999 by the Center for Disease Control (CDC) 
to run a network of labs that can respond to biological and chemical terrorism, now has international labs in 
Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Although this is a step in the right direction, the United States 
or any other BTWC signatory would not have the laboratory assistance if an outbreak occurred in any other 
country. Evidence would have to be collected and then shipped back to a credible lab, significantly 
affecting the credibility of the evidence. 
136 Paul G. Cassell, “Establishing Violations of International Law: Yellow Rain and the Treaties 
Regulating Biological and Chemical Warfare,” Stanford Law Review 35, no. 2 (January 1983), 269. 
Additionally, there are measures outlined in the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention that could assist in 
giving legal and technical guidance in a BW investigation.  
137 One example of an Adversary Investigation that did eventually prove to successfully attribute a 
BW incident was the United States accusations of an anthrax release in Sverdlovsk in 1979, as will be 
discussed later in this chapter.  
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is likely to be a political adversary of the investigated country, the investigation will 
likely be dismissed as political propaganda, and the international community may regard 
any evidence presented in an adversarial investigation as tainted.138 Examples of such 
failed adversarial investigations include the People’s Republic of China accusing the 
United States of using BW in the Korean War; Cuba accusing the United States of using 
a crop duster to induce a dengue fever epidemic in Cuba in 1981; and the Taiwan 
government accusing China of infecting their pork markets with foot and mouth disease 
in 1997, as discussed in the introduction to this chapter.139 
In all of these cases, it is important to note that the investigations took 
place internally. The accusing country was accusing another member state of using BW 
within its own territory (for example, China accusing the United States of using BW 
within Chinese territory). Therefore, the accusing country was able to conduct its own 
internal investigation, and release its own internal review and “evidence.” The inability of 
any of these countries’ accusations to garner enough international support and credibility 
to launch an official international investigation merely reinforces the glaring need for 
international BW investigations to be conducted by an impartial investigation team. 
b. Consultative BTWC Meetings 
Article Five of the BWTC provides for bilateral and/or multilateral 
consultations between states parties should a non-compliance allegation occur, as agreed 
upon at the treaty’s third Review Conference in 1991. The procedure was invoked in 
1997, following a Cuban allegation that U.S. aircraft had caused a crop disease outbreak 
involving thrips palmi, a polyphagus pest that infects crops like cotton, cucumber, 
melons, and potatoes.140 Information was sought and received from both Cuba and the 
                                                 
138 Cassell, “Establishing Violations of International Law: Yellow Rain and the Treaties Regulating 
Biological and Chemical Warfare,” 272. 
139 For information on Cuban accusations of U.S. BW use in 1981 see “Castro Blames the CIA for 
Epidemic in Cuba,” New York Times (July 27, 1981). For more information on the Taiwanese accusations 
of Chinese BW in Taiwan, see “Foot-and-Mouth Disease Spreads Chaos in Pork Markets,” FAS Online 
(October 1997).  
140 See European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organization, “Diagnostic Protocols for 
Regulated Pests: Thrips Palmi.” https://www.ippc.int/cds_upload/1102695911738_pm7_03_e_1_.pdf. 
Accessed on March 22, 2007. 
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United States, and a two-day meeting was held in Geneva by state parties to hear each 
side’s case.141 The Cubans presented a very weak case, and presented no scientific 
evidence whatsoever to back up their claims. An additional failure of the meeting was 
that no attempt was made by the United States to initiate an internationally based fact-
finding mission, and no push was made to conduct on-site investigations to collect 
scientific samples from within Cuba to empirically clear the United States of guilt in this 
matter. Although under Article Six, states parties may refer compliance matters to the UN 
Security Council, Cuba made no attempt to do so on this occasion.142  
This incident between Cuba and the United States shows how states at 
times use the shield of the BTWC as a sword in an attempt to spread political propaganda 
and undermine a state’s international BW credibility. These bogus claims of non-
compliance also emphasize the need to conduct thorough investigations of all non-
compliance claims. If the United States had initiated an international investigation in the 
thrips palmi case, it could have attained conclusive, internationally supported evidence 
that Cuba was simply making false claims—and Cuba’s credibility, in turn, would have 
been the one to suffer. Mandating investigations—even into suspected bogus claims—
would help deter any future false claims of non-compliance, as countries would be 
unwilling to sacrifice their own political credibility simply to spread false claims of non-
compliance for propaganda purposes. 
Such Consultative Meetings of BTWC state parties remain a weak 
investigatory mechanism. Each meeting must bring together all members of the BTWC, 
which—with 155 members—is in itself is a daunting task. Additionally, scientific 
evidence still must be presented to successfully and accurately attribute a BW incident, 
                                                 
141 See Stimson Center, “America Accused of Violating Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, 
CBW Chronicle 3, no. 3 (October 1997). http://www.stimson.org/cbw/?sn=cb20020113282. Accessed on 
January 15, 2006. 
142 “Weapons of Mass Destruction Verification and Compliance: The State of Play, Challenges, and 
Responses,” International Security Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs (Ottawa: CANADA, January 
2005), 39. The Cuban accusations against the United States led to a two-and-a-half page report and twelve 
submissions received from the various States Parties of the BTWC. The report states that, among the seven 
members of the Investigation Bureau and the ten other countries submitting briefs on Cuba’s allegations, 
there were some state parties that concluded there was no causal link between the over-flight of the U.S. 
aircraft and the insect infestation, while there were other countries that asserted that the lack of further 
detailed information made it impossible to draw any definitive conclusions. 
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and the consultative meeting mechanism does not provide for a legal, impartial 
investigation. Therefore, the consultative meeting approach would face the same scrutiny 
of evidence as adversarial investigations; any evidence presented by the accuser will most 
likely be deemed incredible or pure propaganda. 
c. UN General Assembly Investigations 
Many state parties to the BTWC recognize the UN General Assembly as 
an excellent forum able to conduct impartial investigations in the incident of a member 
state’s noncompliance with the BTWC.  The UN Secretary General has presumed 
inherent authority under Article 99 of the UN Charter to conduct fact-finding missions to 
inform himself of any situation which threatens international peace and security. 
Additional provisional procedures as outlined in General Assembly Resolution 37/98D—
passed by the Security Council in 1988 and applicable to all UN states—mandated that a 
list of experts be nominated by states to be available for fact-finding missions; a list of 
laboratories be made available to do sample analysis; and guidelines established for the 
conduct of missions agreed by a group of experts.143 The UN Department for 
Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA) was requested to maintain the lists. The guidelines 
contain information on assessing whether to proceed with a particular fact-finding 
mission, inspection techniques and modalities, expertise that it would be useful to have 
on a mission and procedures for accrediting laboratories for analyzing samples. This 
mechanism remains available to UN member states to date, but has since tremendously 
atrophied. The lists of experts and laboratories were last updated in 1989. In advance of 
the BTWC Experts Meeting in July 2004 the UNDDA requested member states to help 
update them, but few ever responded.144 Additionally, regardless of the list of experts 
that is supposed to be maintained by the UNDDA, the UN does not maintain a standing, 
permanent group of investigatory experts. An investigation team—chosen from the list of 
                                                 
143 “Weapons of Mass Destruction Verification and Compliance: The State of Play, Challenges, and 
Responses,” 34. The Secretary-General has made use of the mechanism on several occasions, in relation to 
alleged chemical, biological or toxin use in Afghanistan and Indochina (1981 and 1982); Iran (1984-1986, 
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144 Ibid. 
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impartial experts—is compiled only after an alleged BW incident takes place. This could 
result in critical time delays and greatly jeopardize any subsequent investigation. 
(1) Lack of on-site Access.  Although the UN General 
Assembly has conducted BW investigations in the past, the largest problem it and any 
country faces when attempting to conduct an international BW investigation is the 
inability to enter and investigate a BW incident in a country that refuses to allow the 
investigation team permission to enter its sovereign territory. As recognized and 
generally respected under international law, no state or non-state group may enter another 
state’s territory to conduct investigations, or even provide humanitarian aid and 
assistance, without the explicit permission from the host country.145 General Assembly 
Resolution 37/98D simply states that groups appointed by the Secretary General should 
undertake onsite sampling when the countries concerned cooperate and such sampling is 
relevant to the investigation.146 The resolution does not explain what should happen if a 
country refuses access to an alleged BW site, and given the General Assembly’s inability 
to issue authoritative orders, gaining onsite inspection will continue to be a major 
problem for any investigations led by the UN General Assembly. 
Time is of the essence when it comes to properly being able to 
diagnose and attribute an outbreak of unnatural disease. The inability to both form an 
investigation team, as well as gain timely access to the site of an alleged international 
BW outbreak compromises the authenticity of evidence samples, eye witness reports and 
memories of the incident, and may even cause nations to become impatient with the 
investigation, to despair of subjecting the alleged aggressor to international disapproval 
and condemnation, and may result in retaliatory, unilateral action.147  
                                                 
145 See Ann Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the Use of Force in 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, NY), 2003. 
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For all of these reasons, relying on the UN General Assembly to 
compile an impartial investigatory team once an illegal BW incident takes place is an 
insufficient mechanism of successfully attributing an international BW attack. 
d. Security Council Meetings 
As discussed previously in this chapter, Article VI the BTWC stipulates 
that any state member finding another state member to be in violation of the treaty can 
bring the matter before the UN Security Council. Despite there being multiple 
accusations by various states of noncompliance since the BTWC inception, no states has 
officially brought a BW use accusation before the Security Council (SC). 
One could speculate that the Security Council would try to assemble an 
investigatory team, much like the one proposed by the General Assembly. The only 
advantage, however, that the Security Council possesses that the General Assembly does 
not is the Security Council’s ability to order countries to submit to onsite inspections. 
Despite this authority, however, the Security Council faces the crippling motion of 
another SC member’s veto on ordering a country to submit to onsite inspections. 
Therefore, for both reasons of legal and political impotency, the Security Council, itself, 
may not prove to be an effective vehicle for onsite investigations in international BW 
incidents. 
With that said, there is a need for two critical things if international BW 
attribution capabilities is to improve at all: a permanent, agreed upon, legally binding 
mandate that establishes a standing international, impartial investigation team in the event 
of an international BW attack; and an internationally agreed upon standard of evidence 
and evidence handling standards. As the FAS Working Group on Biological Weapons 
Verification has stated, 
An effective mechanism for investigating alleged use of biological and 
toxin weapons will not only enhance compliance with the BTWC by 
deterring use, but will also assure States Parties that any suspicious 





offer a means by which countries wrongly suspected of violation can 
demonstrate their compliance, and it will discourage unfounded and 
destabilizing accusations.148 
Additionally, the possibility of tense international political relationships 
impeding successful BW investigations reinforces the role of allies in combating WMD 
and protecting U.S. national security interests, both at home and abroad. Positive, 
preexisting relationships and positive international relations are critical to coordinating 
events, clinical samples, and findings in an international BW event.149 Without friends 
and allies, and sound and enforceable international legal mandates, successful 
international BW attribution may remain unattainable.  
C. AN INTERNATIONAL CASE STUDY: SVERDLOVSK  
 The problems the United States faced in the months after the Sverdlovsk outbreak 
accurately depict some of the ongoing problems of definitive attribution in an 
international BW outbreak. Although the Sverdlovsk incident occurred nearly thirty years 
ago, the hurdles to attributing that anthrax outbreak would be the same hurdles the 
international community would face today if a similar incident occurred.  
 The Sverdlovsk anthrax incident in 1979 merely confirmed what the international 
community had already been suspecting since the USSR signed (in 1972) and ratified (in 
1976) the BTWC: the USSR was cheating. Some academics insist that the USSR’s 
noncompliance of its BTWC treaty obligations marked the first gross violation of post-
Word War II treaties, and caused a massive shift in the international legal order that has 
yet to shift back.150 
Soon after the Soviets signed the BTWC in 1972, the Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) told the U.S. government that 
the Soviets were cheating on their treaty commitments, with proof from satellite spy 
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photos—which, at the time, was the only available way to verify that the BTWC’s 
mandates were being enforced.151 Despite this evidence, the U.S. government did not 
want to accuse the USSR of treaty violations because the United States feared it would 
lose its other ongoing nuclear negotiations with the Soviets by making such 
accusations.152 Additionally, without the ability to concretely investigate and prove to the 
entire international community that the USSR was cheating on BTWC mandates, the 
United States had no incentive to accuse the Soviets of violations—since paradoxically, 
the allegations would tarnish the BTWC treaty and instead focus attention on the treaty’s 
lack of verification. Therefore, the treaty that was weakly constructed so as to appease a 
world super-power was subsequently ignored and further weakened when that same super 
power chose not to honor its commitments. 
The Soviets chose to cheat on the BTWC for their own political reasons; the 
Kremlin felt the Soviets offensive biological weapons program was integral to the USSR 
remaining a world super-power, and saw biological weapons as a counterbalance to the 
ever-expanding U.S. nuclear program. The Soviets made their own political calculation 
when choosing to sign the BWTC—to appease and continue to deceive their international 
counterparts—while continuing to develop their vast offensive biological warfare 
program. In turn, the United States made its own strategic cost-benefit analysis that 
balanced contemporary international political relationships and international legal 
commitments. In the end, the U.S. commitment to strengthening its own proposed treaty 
was on the losing end of that calculation. Once the world became aware that the Soviets 
had been incessantly cheating on their BTWC commitments—through the Sverdlovsk 
accident, various intelligence reports from numerous countries, admissions from defected  
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former Soviet scientists involved in the USSR’s BW program, as well as through the 
public admission of President Yeltsin in 1992—the BTWC was seen by many as a dead 
in the water.153 
1. No On Site Access 
At the height of the Cold War, there was no chance at all that the USSR would 
allow the United States or any other entity to enter its territory to investigate a suspected 
disease outbreak. Political tensions were too high, and no legal mechanisms existed to 
force the USSR to capitulate to an investigation. As a result, the only mechanism of 
evidence the U.S. government could rely on was intelligence and surveillance evidence. 
Intelligence evidence, however, was not enough to indict the Soviet Union of any 
wrong doing. Recently declassified U.S. intelligence reports from 1979 speak of “rumors 
of an accident at the biological warfare institute at Sverdlovsk,” but also indicate that the 
reports “added little to our knowledge of what actually happened at Sverdlovsk.”154 
Citing its own insufficiency as legitimate evidence that a BW outbreak had occurred, the 
report goes on to say that “despite the proliferation of rumors of a BW-related accident, 
there is insufficient evidence that the alleged deaths can be attributed to unlawful storage 
of a BW agent.”155 
2. No Open Records 
As reported by multiple sources, almost immediately after the anthrax outbreak, 
the Soviet government confiscated the medical records of the Sverdlovsk victims, and the 
current Russian government has even now refused to release data or details on what 
happened April 2, 1979 in Sverdlovsk.156  
One of the only current sources of first-hand evidence of the types of injuries 
sustained by victims of the Sverdlovsk outbreak are the hand-written notes of Dr. Faina 
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Abramova, who was one of the emergency room doctors treating the many patients who 
came into her Sverdlovsk facility after the outbreak occurred. In 1979, she risked her life 
and her job when she hid her patient charts and autopsy reports from the KGB. She also 
hid the jars of organs and tissue samples from the outbreak in her hospital’s pathology 
museum so they would not be confiscated.157 Without Dr. Abramova’s notes, the U.S. 
government and academics would not have been able to build a sound, scientifically-
backed case that an anthrax outbreak had, in fact, occurred in the Sverdlovsk. 
The 1979 Sverdlovsk outbreak presented the United States with multiple 
problems and challenges of attempting to attain first-hand evidence or records that a BW 
outbreak had, in fact, occurred in the USSR. Sadly, there have been very few legal and 
political advancements made in trying to close this gaping hole in the field of BW 
attribution. Under current international law, the United States and/or other international 
organizations cannot enter a country to investigate a suspected BW outbreak unless 
invited to do so by the country where the outbreak occurred. Additionally, even if a state 
were to invite the United States or a neutral foreign entity to enter its sovereign territory 
to assist in a BW investigation, it is possible that the state would not allow any of the BW 
investigation evidence to leave the country at all.158 A state has the right to report or not 
report any evidence collected in a BW investigation. The consequence of this reality is 
exactly what occurred in the Sverdlovsk: a state was able to deny for over twenty years 
that a deadly BW pathogen had killed and maimed dozens of its citizens. Without the 
ability to collect evidence and records of the outbreak, the international community could 
suspect and point fingers all it wanted; but the USSR could only be considered a suspect, 
and could not be classified as a perpetrator of BW use. 
D. CONCLUSION 
 It is unsettling to think that most of the major problems that plagued the United 
States during the Sverdlovsk outbreak are still an issue today, nearly twenty-five years 
later. Due to multiple factors, including the lack of a domestic consensus on both national 
                                                 
157 Guillemin, Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak, 70. 
158 Personal communication with Dr. Randall Murch, 18 July 2006. 
 73
and international BW defense policy, as well as the lack of agreed upon investigatory 
protocols for either a domestic or international BW outbreak, the United States has faced 
and will likely again face the same hurdles and complications in BW attribution if 
another outbreak were to occur.  
 In a Post-9/11 environment, and especially in light of the ongoing war in Iraq, 
Americans are very concerned about a country in illegal possession of WMD. Despite 
these concerns and the drastic political and military policies that these concerns led to, 
the United States and the world remains extremely restricted in its international BW 
attribution capabilities. No amount of military force or political savviness can overcome 
the short-comings of international law. If the United States truly wants to increase its 
defenses against a BW attack, the short comings of the BTWC must be addressed and 
corrected. As will be shown in Chapter V, however, strong and sound international law is 
completely dependent on the cooperation of states and national leaders. Often times, a 
state’s domestic agenda and own internal weaknesses in BW attribution hinder any sort 
of consensus on what a sound international BW attribution should be. Until independent 
states can work out their own attribution capabilities, as mandated within the BTWC, the 
strength of any international treaty governing BW defenses will remain only as strong as 
its weakest link.  
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V.  THE IMPEDIMENTS TO BW ATTRIBUTION IN DOMESTIC 
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
No matter what anybody says, if it is five years out, and we are not even 
seeing any smoke from the investigation, then I would say definitely that 
[the Amerithrax] case is cold right now…This [investigation] is just sitting 
out there with nothing happening. 
Christopher Hamilton, former FBI Counterrorism Official, speaking on 
September 16, 2006159 
 
Over five years have passed since the Amerithrax attack of September and 
October of 2001. Millions of dollars and multiple national and international agencies 
have been involved in the investigation, and yet one of the biggest crime mysteries of our 
time remains unsolved.160 In December 2006, a disgruntled Congress called on the FBI to 
release its information on the attacks, blaming the Bureau for the lack of progress in the 
investigation, and reminding the public that “all Americans deserve to know why this 
five-year investigation has made so little progress.”161 
Upon closer examination, however, there are multiple reasons why the 
Amerithrax investigation has slowed down and has not produced as many leads in the 
past months.  As previously discussed, BTWC insists that each nation must police its own 
country to ensure treaty compliance.162 This mandate was again affirmed in 2004 by UN 
Security Council Resolution 1540, which holds: 
[A]ll States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and 
enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to 
manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, 
chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular 
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for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing 
activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them.163 
State parties are required by Article Four of the BTWC to adopt any national 
measures necessary, in accordance with their constitutional processes, to prohibit and 
prevent the banned activities detailed in Article One of the treaty, but the treaty does not 
prescribe the type of measures that should be adopted, although Article Four provides 
that such measures must be adopted in accordance with the state’s constitutional process. 
Therefore, it is up to a nation’s own domestic legislature to determine and adopt the 
procedures necessary to prohibit the acquisition, and implicit use, of biological weapons. 
An in-depth analysis of the on-going Amerithrax investigation reveals the 
weaknesses of the BW policies the United States has implemented, or failed to 
implement, in an attempt to be in compliance with BTWC Article Four. To date, the 
investigation of the Amerithrax attacks has fallen victim to a bureaucratic system of 
governance that is still trying to refine and implement an efficient attribution capability, 
and one that also has yet to agree on what “BW attribution” truly is. Due to very complex 
technical issues, disagreements as to what a proper standard of proof to initiate a BW 
investigation, as well as the ongoing bureaucratic and jurisdictional issues being fought 
out over which government agency should be leading the charge in BW investigations, it 
seems unlikely that any government agency would be able to successfully conduct a 
thorough investigation of the Amerithrax attacks, or any future outbreak. 
1. Roadmap 
This chapter examines the impediments that domestic political environments have 
on a successful biological weapons investigation. It first examines the technical 
impediments to attribution in the United States, including first responder preparedness, as 
well as the lack of cross-agency standard operating procedures for BW investigations. 
This chapter then examines the jurisidictional issues of a domestic biological weapons 
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investigation in the United States, and shows the stark differences in how certain agencies 
typically involved in a BW investigation define the end goal of attribution.  
 Lastly, this chapter applies the above issues to the still on-going Amerithrax 
investigation, to show how domestic politics and organizational constraints could quite 
possibly become the reason the attacks have and may remain unsolved.  
B. TECHNICAL ISSUES 
The first step in the successful attribution of a biological weapons attack is 
identifying that an attack has actually taken place. As discussed in detail in Chapter II, 
this step is sometimes much easier said than done, due to biological weapons unique 
epidemiological characteristics. The defense against a biological weapons attack involves 
a cadre of government communities, from the local level all the way up to the highest 
federal level. (See Table 3). Coordinating the interaction and information sharing 
between these agencies is a significant task, and has yet to be fully worked out to its most 
efficient capacity. 
 
Table 3.   Some of the Agencies Involved in Biological Weapons Outbreaks. 
 Local National International 
Law Enforcement Local Police FBI INTERPOL; CIA: 
FBI, DOD, DOS 
Agriculture Local farmers 
and 
distributors. 












CDC (U.S.); DEFRA 
(U.K./EU); WHO 
Government  Policy and National 
Decision Makers; 
DHHS 
Diplomacy and Arms 
Control Communities 
 
The first line of a country’s biological weapons defense lies at the local level, and 
greatly depends on local doctors and hospitals being adequately trained to recognize the 
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symptoms of an unnatural, BW-related outbreak.164 This ability, however, requires 
doctors and hospitals to continue to take state and federally sponsored classes, so 
physicians can remain up to date and vigilant on the possible symptoms of certain 
weaponized biological agents. Some BW agents—such as anthrax—can cause natural 
infections from natural sources. Additionally, sometimes a BW infection can closely 
resemble other infections, like the common flu, and may go unrecognized for quite some 
time. The sooner local doctors can suspect and recognize that a patient’s symptoms are 
quite unusual and perhaps the result of a BW attack, the quicker state and federal task 
forces can take action to prevent the spread of the disease, but also be able to begin an 
investigatory attribution process. 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES 
Despite the technical impediments to a successful biological weapons 
investigation, one of the most startling hurdles simply lies within the lexicon of 
attribution. Though a successful BW investigation relies on multiple agencies being able 
to work and coordinate their investigations in efficient unison, it is unsettling to know 
that most of the major organizations involved in BW attribution do not even agree on 
what attribution truly is. Each organization has its own role and mission in investigating a 
BW outbreak, and sometimes one organization’s mission is in direct contradiction with 
another organization’s efforts. Should policymakers possess the same definition and 
focus of attribution as forensic investigators? Should the goal of BW attribution 
ultimately be to bring the perpetrators of BW use to justice, so that future offenses could 
be deterred, as forensic investigators hoped? Or should the goal of attribution be being 
able to collect enough legitimate intelligence so that when BW use does occur, 
policymakers are able to act and/or retaliate within a matter of hours or days?  
If national BW attribution efforts are to be successful, the three largest 
communities involved in BW investigations—the public health communities, the forensic 
communities, and the policy communities—must agree on what the end-goal of a BW 
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investigation must be. These organizations have made gains since 2001, but before the 
Amerithrax outbreaks, these major organizations’ differing lexicons of attribution directly 
contradicted and interfered with each other’s investigations. 
1. Public Health Community: Epidemiology 
As evidenced by the mission of the CDC, medical and public health communities’ 
goals in the event of a disease outbreak is to protect public health, and prevent the spread 
of the disease outbreak.165 This main mission of identifying and detecting that a disease 
outbreak has occurred greatly influences the manner in which public health agencies 
conduct outbreak investigations, as will be discussed more below. Through a complex 
system of interrelated agencies and laboratories, the public health communities focus on 
disease detection and epidemiological analysis to pin point the existence and location of 
an outbreak, and then focus on containing and eventually eradicating the source of the 
disease. 
Because of the complex nature of the nation’s public health infrastructure, not 
only is this community’s attribution goals at times in contradiction with other 
communities, but even within the public health community there is a drastic variance in 
the manner in which outbreak investigations are conducted. In fact, there is significant 
state-to-state variability in the existing public health system, and also variability at the 
local levels. Effectively, each of the fifty states has its own detection systems since public 
health surveillance at the state and local level is based upon the constitutions, regulations,  
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rules, and common law of each state.166 So even within the public health community it 
can be challenging to coordinate who is in charge and what the overall mission is during 
an outbreak investigation.167 
Additionally, although the CDC and other public health agencies are involved in 
covert, intentional disease outbreaks, the majority of their missions focus on 
environmental sampling of overt, naturally-occurring diseases. Public health agencies are 
extremely knowledgeable about disease causing organisms, but some are less familiar 
with the behaviors and capabilities of weaponized disease causing organisms. As such, 
the CDC and other public health agencies’ capabilities with and investigations into 
disease outbreaks greatly differ during covert and overt disease investigations. Once a 
disease outbreak shifts from being a suspected natural outbreak, to an intentional, BW-
related outbreak, the public health community relies more upon the law enforcement and 
forensic communities to conduct the investigation. However, both communities remain 
actively involved in and are critical to the overall BW investigation. (See Figure 3 and 
Figure 4.) 
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Figure 3.   Likely flow of communication during overt disease outbreak in most 
(solid line) and some (dashed line) jurisdictions.168 
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Figure 4.   Likely flow of communication during covert bioterrorism in most (solid 
line) and some (dashed line) jurisdictions.169 
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2. Forensic Community: Microbial Forensics 
Another major player in an outbreak investigation is the forensics community, 
which includes law enforcement agencies, microbial forensics specialists from the FBI, 
and other national investigative agencies. Microbial forensics can be viewed as the link 
between the public health community’s attribution aims to control a disease outbreak, and 
the policy community’s end-goal of wanting to know who is responsible for an outbreak. 
The detailed break-down of BW agent epidemiology in Chapter II—detailing the 
importance of knowing an agent’s pathogenisity, infectivity, incubation period, virulence, 
as well as it’s possible phylogenetics—is an example of the emerging field of microbial 
forensics, and shows that with the continued advancement and implementation of this 
science, major gains in BW attribution can be possible. 
For the microbial forensics community, attribution is the “assignment of a sample 
of questioned origin to a source of known origin to a high degree of scientific 
certainty.”170  Forensics integrates hard science with the investigative process, and serves 
as an analysis and interpretation of available physical evidence to determine its relevance 
to events, people, places, tools, methods, processes, intentions, and plans.171 The end-
goal for forensics attribution is not only to determine what caused a disease outbreak, but 
also to gather enough scientifically sound evidence to be able to identify and prosecute 
who it is that was responsible for the disease outbreak. This mission greatly influences 
the manner in which the forensics community conducts outbreak investigations, as well 
as the way in which the forensics community is able to share information with other 
organizations. (See Table 4). 
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Table 4.   Phases of Forensics Investigations.172 
Phases of Forensics Investigations 
1. Intelligence and Information Gathering 
2. Field Investigation 
3. Crime Scene Investigation 
4. Laboratory Analysis 
5. Interpretation, Integration, Application 
6. Building, Shaping Prosecution 
7. Communication and Decision Making 
 
The forensics community places the highest amount of emphasis on sample 
collection and analysis. The community has repeatedly cautioned that one of the biggest 
short-comings in BW investigations is that there remains no uniform evidence collection 
standards among the many agencies involved in the investigation.173 The FBI has its own 
very rigorous sample collection standard operating procedures (SOPs), but the public 
health communities and policy communities do not abide by or follow these same SOPs. 
Whereas the CDC is usually entirely focused on environmental sampling, the FBI 
conducts outbreak investigations from a forensic standpoint, and the preservation of the 
samples is of the utmost importance. In fact, for the forensics community,  
[I]dentification, collection, handling, and preservation of samples prior to 
arrival at the laboratory are crucial to avoid compromising subsequent 
assays. The challenge is to preserve signatures in the sample when it is 
removed from the crime scene… There are no standardized microbial 
evidence collection kits…Evidence collection procedures need to be 
developed with the intent, if possible, of preserving traditional forensic 
evidence, such as hair, fibers, fingerprints, and human DNA, as well as 
providing adequate material for microbial forensic analyses.174  
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Although microbial forensics is a critical component in a BW investigation, it is a 
relatively new player on the scene. During the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta, 
defense-experts came to the sobering realization that the United States had no national 
forensic program for detecting and investigating WMD.175 As a result, forensic 
specialists—led by the FBI—brought together an interagency community of experts to 
begin creating a WMD and BW attribution capability. This interagency community 
combined the expertise of phlyogenetics, systematics, epidemiology, and the forensics 
community to create the FBI’s Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU).176 Today, 
HMRU provides the capability to safely and effectively respond to criminal acts and 
incidents involving the use of hazardous materials and develops the FBI's technical 
proficiency and readiness for crime scene and evidence-related operations in cases 
involving chemical, biological, and radiological materials and wastes.177  
Before HMRU was created, however, there was no hazardous materials response 
capability at all.178 BW investigations were ad-hoc, and primarily led by the military 
specialists that would come in and conduct a public health-like investigation. The quality 
of these investigations was not thorough, and any evidence collected during such 
investigations was not sound enough to be used as evidence in a criminal prosecution.179 
Before the formation of HMRU, there was no civilian or forensic outreach, and the 
military simply used what it knew how to do to clean up any hazardous material 
incidents. 
After the 1996 Olympics and in the wake of the Amerithrax attacks, the scientific 
and forensics communities realized that—in addition to an HMRU—there was an 
immediate need for a laboratory organization that could perform microbial forensics 
analyses in the wake of bioterrorism event.180 As part of the effort to deter biological 
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terrorism and strengthen the law enforcement response to such an act, the United States 
established a microbial forensic laboratory known as the National Bioforensics Analysis 
Center (NBFAC), which is part of the Department of Homeland Security and operates in 
partnership with the FBI. The NBFAC now provides a central facility to conduct analysis 
of evidentiary material. Although the NBFAC’s infrastructure and capabilities draw on 
the best scientific resources available in the United States and on some resources 
internationally, the practitioners of the nascent field of microbial forensics recognize that 
there remain significant gaps in both science and operations that must be filled to 
establish a more readily responsive and effective system.181 
Despite the creation of NBFAC and other facilities and organizations to assist 
with microbial forensics in BW investigations, the science remains relatively new.182 A 
continued commitment to the development and application of microbial forensics to BW 
investigations could lead to tremendous advances, and help bring the United States much 
closer to being better able to quickly identify and attribute a BW attack. As discussed in 
Chapter II, advances in phylogenetics and epidemiology have greatly advanced the field 
of microbial forensics, but much more work needs to be done. Scientists have 
emphasized that the ultimate goal of source attribution is to be able to individualize a 
sample so that it can be traced to a unique source, but this is unlikely with current 
capabilities.183 Forensic specialists used the Amerithrax case as an example of both the 
successes as well as the limits of microbial forensics. 
Consider the… anthrax letter attack…The data were qualitatively 
interpreted as the Ames strain and focused the investigation towards 
laboratory sources. Yet, no further attribution was possible. “Grand leaps” 
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maximize efficiency for forensic analysis are needed. Accumulation of the 
existing genetic information of pathogens and near neighbors into 
accessible databases is essential.184 
The continued development and application of forensic microbiology is essential 
if the United States wants to be able to criminally prosecute or punish someone 
responsible for a BW attack. Without the ability to collect enough legally sound evidence 
against a suspect or suspects, any person or group responsible for a BW attack would not 
be able to be prosecuted in a court of law. Current forensic specialists have emphasized 
that a strong forensic capability is needed for attribution of animal, plant, and food-borne 
pathogens and toxins to provide the law enforcement, intelligence, agriculture, public 
health, and homeland security communities with information to assist in identifying 
perpetrators of biocrimes and bioterrorism and to serve as a deterrence factor.185 And 
although the ultimate prosecution and conviction of someone responsible for BW attack 
is the common end-goal among all communities, the manner and speed at which the 
forensics community is able to work is, at times, in contradiction to other organizations’ 
attribution missions. 
3. Policy Community: Who Did It? 
The policy community’s main mission is to protect the American public. When a 
BW outbreak occurs, the policy community wants to know who is responsible, so that 
proper political steps can be taken—whether it be stepping up the country’s civilian 
defenses, initiating political negotiations with another country at the peak of an 
international incident, or implementing military action.  
The policy community, however, significantly relies on the intelligence 
community for information regarding any illegal BW activity, whether it be national or 
international. High-level policy officials in charge of BW attribution efforts insist that the 
intelligence community must improve its detection methods so that policy-makers could 
have evidence that BW activity was actually going on within a state, as well as within our 
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own country. This insistence shows that what “attribution” means to a policy official is 
quite different than what attribution means to a forensic specialists. In fact, one State 
Department official has insisted that when it came to standards of evidence for BW 
attribution, the policy community has decided against a “beyond a reasonable doubt” and 
has instead decided on a “reasonable man standard.”186  
By shifting their standard of evidence to only a “reasonable man standard,” the 
policy community puts themselves in a stronger position to respond to a BW attack, but 
in a very precarious position when it comes to actually solving and prosecuting the crime, 
and does little to gain international credibility and support. In addition, the policy 
community’s need to respond quickly to an attack puts their intelligence investigations at 
odds with the forensic community’s need to conduct a thorough and legally sound 
investigation. This dichotomy has been the source of much contention during the 
Amerithrax outbreak, as well as other domestic and international investigations.  
D. A DOMESTIC CASE STUDY: THE ONGOING AMERITHRAX 
INVESTIGATION 
After 9/11, U.S. defense experts knew that the country needed to remain on high 
alert, as another attack could be possible. When the anthrax-laced letters began surfacing 
in the U.S. postal system, as well as at the U.S. Capitol, the country’s public health, 
forensic, and policy community lurched into an even higher state of alertness, and 
attempted to come together to undertake the largest BW investigation the U.S. has known 
to date. However, because of the technical and organizational issues between and among 
the three communities, what became known as the Amerithrax investigation struggled, 
and eventually revealed the pitfalls of a nation without an established BW attribution 
infrastructure and policy. 
1. Technical Issues 
The first reported case in the anthrax outbreak was discovered by an astute 
physician who noticed his patient’s unusual symptoms. Robert Stevens was the first 
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fatality in the Amerithrax outbreak, and worked at the tabloid Sun in Boca Raton, Florida. 
After Stevens came down with odd flu-like symptoms, his physician felt something was 
amiss, but could not concretely identify what was ailing him. The physician ordered some 
blood tests to be conducted, which were then shipped to a laboratory in Jacksonville, 
Florida. The lab technician that examined Mr. Stevens’ blood samples happened to have 
just completed his CDC bioterrorism training. As an encouraging testament to the steps in 
biological defense that the government and the CDC had taken prior to the Amerithrax 
outbreaks, the technician was able to immediately identify that Stevens had respiratory 
anthrax, and this information was passed on to the FBI. Due to the preparedness of the 
lab technician, the public authorities were alerted to the anthrax infection within two days 
of Stevens’ visit with his doctor.187 
The ability for first responders such as doctors, hospital, emergency personnel, 
and lab technicians, to be able to identify infections such as anthrax or botulism is the 
critical first step in being able to determine whether or not an actual outbreak is actually 
taking place. In fact, Mr. Stevens was not the first anthrax victim to be infected in the 
Amerithrax outbreak; Joanna Huden of New York City was later confirmed to have 
cutaneous anthrax, but doctors initially thought she simply had an infected spider bite.188 
After her symptoms began to worsen, Huden went on to see six doctors, and none 
recognized she had a cutaneous anthrax infection. Only after two weeks had passed and 
other victims had been diagnosed with anthrax infections did doctors finally suspect that 
Huden had contracted cutaneous anthrax some time around September 21, 2001.189  
As detailed in Chapter II, the unique epidemiology of most biological weapons 
makes it absolutely essential that first responders be trained and up to date on the possible 
symptoms of a biological weapons-related illness. Without this first line of defense, 
weeks or months could pass before the public and the government is even aware of the 
fact that a BW event has taken place. Once the government was aware that anthrax was  
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being sent through the U.S. postal system in the fall of 2001, it attempted to come 
together to investigate and attribute the source of the attack. However, this proved 
significantly easier said than done. 
2. Jurisdictional Issues: Organizational Zeitgeist  
As detailed above, the three largest communities involved in BW investigations 
have very different approaches and procedures when attempting to attribute a BW attack. 
During the Amerithrax outbreak, these differing procedures created numerous challenges, 
roadblocks, and turf battles that—at times—almost jeopardized the investigation. An FBI 
official speaking on condition of anonymity told this author that the Amerithrax 
investigation has been perpetually plagued by something of an organizational zeitgeist, 
referencing the Hegelian concept of having one’s perception of reality being directly 
influenced by one’s limited environment.190 Due to this organizational zeitgeist and the 
differing methods and goals of attribution among the public health, forensic, and policy 
communities, the Amerithrax attacks have highlighted the dangers of not having a 
cohesive, agreed-upon BW attribution policy, and having a limited perception of reality 
due to one’s own organizational goals can prevent the resolution of one of the largest BW 
attacks on the United States. 
a. The Clash Between the Public Health Community and the   
Forensic Community 
The public health community, led by the CDC, plays a critical role in 
disease surveillance, and is usually the first line of defense in the event of a BW attack. 
Due to the unique method of CDC’s disease investigations, however, the CDC faced 
some new challenges during the Amerithrax outbreak, and the zeitgeist—the specific 
organizational thinking of the public health community’s BW investigation techniques—
at times came to blows with the forensic community that was also on site during the 
outbreaks. 
                                                 
190 Anonymous FBI Interview, June 2006.  
 91
It was the CDC that was first notified of Mr. Steven’s strange symptoms. 
On October 4, 2001, CDC lab cultures confirmed that Stevens had anthrax.191 However, 
even though Stevens had anthrax, the CDC conducted its initial investigation simply as a 
basic epidemiological investigation, and not as a BW investigation. For, as outlined in 
Chapter II, anthrax—though rare—is a naturally occurring bacteria and a person can 
contract an anthrax infection in a natural setting. As such, the CDC began an 
epidemiological investigation, that, as also previously noted, did not have any 
homogenous, previously established standard operating procedures.192 
The CDC sent out investigative teams to scour the locations where 
Stevens had been before he fell ill, including near his Florida home and work place, and 
some mountain paths and streams in North Carolina where he had bee hiking with his 
family.193 For precautionary purposes, the CDC also contacted the FBI to tell them of 
Stevens’ diagnosis. It was not until the anthrax case was established as criminal in nature 
that the FBI moved from the secondary to the primary role in the investigation.194 It was 
also at this point that the two agencies’ organization zeitgeist began to complicate the 
investigation. 
As has been documented, early conflicts between the CDC’s 
epidemiological team and the FBI criminal investigators over evidence collection and 
witness interviews highlighted the very different cultures of the two organizations.195 As 
a testament to the two very different procedures for disease investigation, during the 
anthrax investigation, the FBI approached each aspect of the case as a crime scene 
investigation—seeing every item as a piece of possible evidence. Additionally, being 
knowledgeable of the behaviors and capabilities of weaponized anthrax, the FBI entered 
each investigation with adequate protection—with masks and gloves, and at times in full 
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HAZMAT suits.196 To the horror of some of the FBI agents involved, during the earlier 
parts of the investigation, CDC investigators would show up at an infected location with 
no masks and no protection, ready to undertake what they felt was going to be a simple 
epidemiological and environmental sampling.197 The FBI very quickly informed the 
CDC of the dangers of weaponized anthrax, and made sure that—despite the CDCs 
organizational culture—that the publich health investigators working on the Amerithrax 
case became HAZMAT certified, and made certain that the CDC approach the anthrax 
investigation as a biological weapons incident, and not a public health outbreak.198 
An additional incident which highlighted the stark differences in the pubic 
health community and forensic community’s attribution approach, was the incident 
involving the U.S. Postal Facilities that had sorted and sent the anthrax-letters that began 
infecting members of the American public. In an effort to calm the American public and 
attempt to not compound problems by silencing authorities, the White House began 
allowing CDC doctors to speak directly to the public, and allowed the CDC to be the 
final say in some instances of what suspected areas were safe and what areas were still 
possibly contaminated.199 On October 18, 2001, U.S. Postmaster General John Potter 
went to the U.S. Postal Service’s Brentwood distribution center to try to ease the 
mounting concerns of the American public and the nation’s 800,000 postal workers that 
the mail, in fact, was safe, despite anthrax being found in letters across the country.200 As 
discussed in Chapter II, Potter and his executives had consulted with expert doctors at 
CDC, as well as the D.C. Department of Public Health. The CDC's top infectious disease 
specialists had concluded that the facility could not be infected with anthrax, that 
employees could return to work, and that there was no reason to start the Brentwood 
employees on preventive antibiotics.201  
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The FBI had no jurisdiction on the decision as to whether or not Potter 
would be safe going into the Brentwood facility.202 Knowing the pathogenecity of 
weaponized anthrax, the FBI tried to warn the CDC of the dangers of allowing anyone 
into the Brentwood facility, let along the Postmaster General and an entire press 
conference. The FBI shared its modeling evidence and its information on weaponized 
anthrax with the CDC specialists, but—possibly due to their limited organizational 
thinking—they chose to ignore the FBI’s advice and evidence, and told Potter and other 
public officials to feel safe entering the Brentwood facility.203 The CDC believed there 
was virtually no risk of any anthrax contamination in the facility, and that without the 
letter being opened at Brentwood, there was no risk of any anthrax escaping. 204 As was 
later proven, however, the FBI was correct, and the CDC was wrong in its assumptions. 
The FBI, however, was not given the authority to make such decisions, and so the 
investigation and those involved continued to struggle against their own organizational 
zeitgeist.  
During the investigation, both the forensic and public health communities 
struggled with the lack of a cohesive attribution policy, as well as the lack of an 
established facility that could assist in examining samples taken from onsite inspections. 
Once the FBI and the CDC got on the same page as to the standard operating procedures 
of a criminal disease investigation, both agencies faced a lack of lab support that could 
test samples that were being collected on site.205 During one part of the investigation 
involving the U.S. Capitol mail, the FBI collected over 170 samples in fourteen days that 
all needed to be tested for the presence of anthrax.206 The labs that were supporting the 
investigation, however, could not handle the case load. As a result, the FBI had to 
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quarantine all remaining U.S. Capitol mail, put it in 635 plastic garbage bags, and then 
place the garbage bags into 250 sealed drums, so as to prevent hazardous materials from 
escaping.207 The FBI did not have enough man power and lab power to test the letters 
quickly enough, however, and so the members of the FBI investigation team came up 
with a novel technique to address their limitations. FBI officials trained the onsite 
HAZMAT workers to take microbiology samples from the sealed U.S. Capitol Mail 
letters.208 The FBI forensic specialists trained the HAZMAT workers to collect samples 
from the letters, swab the sample onto Petri dishes, and then catalogue the Petri dishes.209 
This ingenuity saved a tremendous amount of time, as previously the workers had been 
simply collecting samples, and then sending the samples to the labs so the lab technicians 
could transfer the samples to Petri dishes, which the lab technicians would then wait to 
develop and then analyze. Now, the FBI and the HAZMAT crews were able to send the 
catalogued samples directly to the lab for a much quicker turn-around. This technique 
allowed the FBI to cut-off the tremendous backlog in sample analyzation, and in five 
days accomplished the analysis of a load of samples that was previously taking thirty 
days to complete.210 It was this ingenuity that discovered, within those 250 sealed drums, 
the anthrax-laced letter that has been addressed to Senator Leahy, but fortunately never 
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Image 3. The anthrax-laced envelope addressed to Senator Leahy.212 
  
The Leahy letter initially registered 20,000 anthrax spores in a quick test.213 As noted 
earlier in Chapter II, it takes roughly 2,500 spores to become infected with inhalation 
anthrax, and a lethal dose of 10,000 spores can be inhaled in one breath. The letter also 
bore the now infamous childish handwriting and was taped shut, but what appeared to be 
anthrax was spilling from the envelope when agents were examining it.214 Due to a 
misread zip code, this letter’s delivery had been stalled, and eventually got quarantined 
after the discovery of the Daschle letter.215 Had the Leahy letter been delivered to the 
Capitol along with the Daschle letter, thousands could have become infected, and many 
more could have died. 
Despite the frustrations and competing organizational cultures between the 
CDC and the FBI during the Amerithrax investigation, the two agencies were able to 
coordinate their efforts, as well as create novel techniques to address the short-comings of 
not having an established BW attribution policy and framework. The lack of such a 
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policy, however, certainly caused many problems during the investigation. This not only 
plagued the FBI and CDC at the outset of the investigation, but five years into the 
investigation, the differing cultures and attribution aims between the forensic and policy 
communities continue to plague the Amerirthrax investigation. 
b. The Attribution Aims of the Policy Community 
The public battle between Congress and the FBI over the speed and 
direction of the Amerithrax investigation highlights the very different approaches the 
policy and forensic communities have taken on BW attribution. The policy community 
wants results, but almost at the expense of a solid investigation. In October of 2006, 
Congress publicly lambasted the FBI, saying that in five years, “the FBI has little in the 
way of results to show for its work."216 The FBI, in turn, told Congress that the Bureau 
will no longer brief them on the case, since sensitive information about the investigation 
citing congressional sources was reported in the media.217 Such leaking of information 
greatly jeopardizes any legal case the FBI will be able to build against a suspect. 
However, members of Congress are adamant that they be briefed on the progress and 
state of the investigation. In December 2006, Senator Charles Grassley insisted that  
In one of the most important terrorism investigations ever undertaken by 
the FBI, it is unbelievable to me that members of Congress, some who 
were targets of the anthrax attacks, haven't been briefed for years…As an 
institution, Congress cannot be cut-off from detailed information about the 
conduct of one of the largest investigations in FBI history… [Such] 
information is vital in order to fulfill its Constitutional responsibility to 
conduct oversight.218 
Regardless of what the outcome will be in this battle over information 
sharing, this very public debate highlights the U.S. lack of standard of operating 
procedures during a biological weapons event and investigation. Who is in charge, who  
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hears what information, and what the over-all mission is for a BW investigation remains 
unclear. And in the interim, the policy and forensic communities continue to struggle 
over the investigation. 
Five years after the Amerithrax outbreak, at a recent international 
conference entitled “Identification, Characterization, and Attribution of Biological 
Weapons Use,” further evidence was uncovered of the disagreement between the policy 
community and the forensic community over a cohesive national attribution policy. ”219 
In July 2006, U.S. Assistant Secretary Paula DeSutter of the U.S. State Department’s 
Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation gave a keynote speech at an 
international conference on BW Attribution. DeSutter spoke on the record of the main 
policy challenges that BW attribution placed on the current U.S. government. The 
Secretary told the group that her Bureau’s main responsibility was—in the event of a 
state or non-state actor actually using biological weapons either at home or abroad—to be 
able to go to the President and say, “Mr. President, here is who did it, and here is who we 
stop from doing it again.”220 
From her remarks, it was clear that the Secretary’s main tool for 
investigating and attributing international BW outbreaks was intelligence. Although 
intelligence is a necessary element of BW attribution, the fact that the policy community 
so heavily focuses on intelligence and inter-agency information sharing puts their policy 
at direct odds with the forensic communities need to conduct a closed investigation for 
the purposes of securing evidence for an eventual criminal prosecution. 
In fact, at one point during the conference, an American participant with 
extensive experience in microbial forensics with the FBI asked the Secretary what the 
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U.S. government’s definition of attribution was. DeSutter said that policymakers do not 
think of BW attribution in the same terms as forensic specialists. She said the policy 
community’s focus is not on long term deterrence and future prosecution of a crime; 
rather, their priority is simply collecting enough intelligence to be able to make an 
educated enough guess as to who the perpetrator is because “both leadership and the 
public is going to want something about [the BW outbreak] right away.”221 She insisted 
this was why her standard of evidence for BW attribution was not “beyond a reasonable 
doubt,” and was instead a “reasonable man standard.” 
At another point in the conference, a British participant with prior 
experience in BW investigations emphasized to DeSutter that with BW attribution being 
a transnational problem in a complex international environment, U.S. policymakers 
should realize that investigation mechanisms are most supported by the international 
community when they can gain credibility before they are needed to be used. The 
Secretary responded by noting that the standards of evidence of what is sufficient to 
initiate a BW investigation are still unclear in the international community, and need to 
be made as low as possible.222 She insisted that governments should not have to have 
actual proof of BW use before they are able to collect intelligence and investigate any 
suspicious outbreak or activity. AS DeSutter insisted that governments “need to act when 
there’s smoke, because once there is a fire, people will die.”223 
DeSutter’s comments reflect the opinion of the current administration’s 
view of the standard of proof needed for attribution, and also highlight the conflict 
between the domestic policy community and the legal/forensic community’s definitions 
and goals of BW attribution. Other members of the conference—international 
participants representing other state governments, as well as other American participants 
                                                 
221 “Identification, Characterization, and Attribution of Biological Weapons Use,” Conference 
Proceedings, July 2006. See Dr. Anne Clunan, Dr. Peter Lavoy, and Elizabeth Stone, “Identification, 
Characterization, and Attribution of Biological Weapons Use,” London, UK, July 12-13, 2006. Accessed 
at: http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/events/recent/bwconferenceDec06_rpt.asp, on March 6, 2007.  
222 “Identification, Characterization, and Attribution of Biological Weapons Use,” Conference 
Proceedings, July 2006. See Dr. Anne Clunan, Dr. Peter Lavoy, and Elizabeth Stone, “Identification, 
Characterization, and Attribution of Biological Weapons Use,” London, UK, July 12-13, 2006. Accessed 
at: http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/events/recent/bwconferenceDec06_rpt.asp, on March 6, 2007. 
223 Ibid. 
 99
who had worked on BW issues in previous administrations—disagreed with DeSutter and 
insisted that a more thorough standard of proof should be required for BW investigation 
and attribution, both domestically and internationally. A BW investigation requires an 
established standard of proof since it is a criminal investigation. In the American legal 
community, a probable cause standard—which is more stringent than a reasonable man 
standard—is most often needed before a magistrate will approve a search warrant for an 
investigation into any suspected illegal activity. Unless investigators can meet the 
probable cause standard of proof, a search warrant will not be issued, and any evidence 
obtained in absence of a valid search warrant cannot be used at trial. 
DeSutter’s comments suggest that the policy community needs immediate 
and only reasonably credible information on BW use, so that proper defensive and 
political steps can be taken to protect the American public in the event of a biological 
weapons attack. Requiring a lower standard of proof can be detrimental, however, as this 
means much less intelligence and “proof” is needed for the government to initiate a 
domestic or international BW investigation into a company, state, or an individual’s 
activities. Additionally, a lower standard of proof, especially in a domestic U.S. 
investigation, could ultimately jeopardize any evidence that is collected, and may 
ultimately undermine the investigation. Investigators may be able to identify and attribute 
the source of an attack, but because they did not abide by Constitutionally mandated 
standards of evidence collection for a federal criminal trial, the perpetrator could be 
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acquitted.224 Additionally, on an international level, if any sort of retaliation from a 
suspected BW attack remains on the table—especially a nuclear retaliation, as the United 
States has reserved as an option—then a higher standard of proof will almost definitely 
be demanded and required.  
DeSutter’s comments highlight the difficulty of establishing the requisite 
standard of proof for BW investigations. Should the policy community have a lower 
standard of proof requirement in order to act when there is smoke, rather than fire? 
DeSutter’s comments make it apparent that the current U.S. policy community’s lexicon 
of attribution is quite different than the U.S. forensic and legal community, as well as 
other international governments, and it seems that “proof” to a U.S. policy maker is not 
the same type of “proof” one can present in an American criminal trial.225 However, this 
issue will have to be resolved if and when the source of a BW attack is identified, 
attributed, and brought to trial.  
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E. CONCLUSION 
Article Four of the BTWC insists that each nation must police its own country to 
ensure treaty compliance.226 When the United States ratified the BTWC in 1975, it was 
required by Article Four to adopt any national measures necessary, in accordance with 
the American constitutional processes, to prohibit and prevent the banned activities 
detailed in Article One of the treaty. It seems, however, that because the treaty does not 
prescribe the type of measures that should be adopted, the United States did not feel 
rushed to develop its own BW investigative and attribution capabilities. Twenty-six years 
later, the lack of such a policy establishing a BW attribution capability proved almost 
crippling to the Amerithrax investigation. 
As has been noted, the investigation remains open and unsolved. This sobering 
reality cannot be pinpointed on any one agency. Until the major players involved in BW 
surveillance, investigation, and response can develop and agree upon a common 
definition of BW attribution, and also agree upon a common end-goal of a BW 
investigation, a national attribution capability will remain undeveloped. The public health 
and forensic communities have made great strides in streamlining and coordinating their 
efforts in a BW investigation. The ongoing battle between the policy community and the 
forensic community over the status of the investigation, however, shows that their starkly 
contrasting organizational zeitgeists continue to prevent them from seeing eye to eye. 
A successful domestic BW attribution capability is contingent upon a single, 
cohesive attribution zeitgeist among all the communities involved in BW investigations. 
The Amerithrax event and its ongoing and daunting investigation should serve as a wake-
up call to the policy community that, despite their own objectives, the nation needs a 
cohesive attribution policy if we are ever to truly answer the question: who did it? 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. RE-EXAMINING THE DETERRENCE CONUNDRUM 
The possibility of an enemy attack using BW on U.S. soil or U.S. allies or troops 
abroad remains one of the biggest threats to U.S. and global security. If “deterrence is the 
historical cornerstone of U.S. defense,”227 the current policies of U.S. biodefense 
measures must credibly convince potential criminals to not engage in criminal and 
deviant activities for fear that they will be apprehended and punished. In order for a BW 
user to fear punishment, norms, laws, and enforcement must be designed and 
implemented to enable governments to attribute attacks to perpetrators and to 
communicate that capacity to would-be attackers.  
The current norms, laws, and BW enforcement policies are significantly lacking 
in their abilities to identify and attribute BW outbreaks and to date have failed to 
apprehend and punish BW violators. Thus, BW deterrence is falling short of its policy 
objectives. Despite the advances the U.S. government has made in the wake of the 2001 
Amerithrax attacks, this thesis has shown there is still significant room for further 
advances. As Dr. Randall Murch of Virginia Tech told this author, “The United States 
still lacks a comprehensive biological weapons attribution strategy. The current 
“Biodefense for the 21st Century” policy is not a strategy—it’s a vision of what a 
biodefense strategy should be.”228 
This thesis has presented three major challenges to the successful attribution of a 
biological weapons attack: the nature of the weapons themselves, and the constraints 
created by international laws and domestic politics. It is only by understanding the 
complex nature of each of these elements, as well as the intricate manner in which these 
three elements are interrelated, that a successful BW attribution policy can be created and 
implemented.  Each of these independent elements is a critical component of deterring 
and eventually attributing the source of a future, or current, biological weapons threat. 
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B. THE BW ATTRIBUTION TYPOLOGY: IDENTIFY, CHARACTERIZE, 
AND ATTRIBUTE 
The unique nature of biological weapons creates a three-pronged typology during 
an investigation of suspected BW use. First, a biological weapons incident must first be 
identified. Often times, disease epidemics can go unnoticed for quite some time before 
public health communities even recognize that a genuine outbreak has, in fact, occurred. 
Second, a disease outbreak must be characterized as a deliberate release of a biological 
weapon, and not simply a natural disease outbreak. And last, once a disease outbreak has 
been ruled as a deliberate criminal incident, the attack must be attributed to the 
perpetrator. 
The success of this typology greatly depends on the epidemiological 
understanding of the disease agent involved in the outbreak, the cooperation of the 
international community and the effectiveness of international laws governing BW use, 
as well as the domestic BW attribution policies and procedures (whether domestic U.S. 
policies of the domestic policies or the state in which the BW attack has occurred) that 
should assist in the investigation of the attack. Therefore, the attribution of the BW 
attack, as well as the deterrence of any future BW attack, directly relies on the successful 
implementation of a BW attribution policy that considers and incorporates all three of 
these elements.  
1. Deterrence from an Epidemiological Perspective 
Because infectious diseases can be classified according to their epidemiologic, 
clinical, and/or microbiologic features, detailed knowledge of these characteristics is a 
critical component for the expeditious identification, investigation, and attribution of a 
BW agent. Additionally, because biological weapons lack a tell-tale signature—unlike 
nuclear or chemical weapons—the understanding and knowledge of the epidemiological 
characteristics of suspected BW agents is essential if a disease outbreak is ever to be 
suspected as a deliberate BW attack. 
Chapter II of this thesis detailed the importance of understanding agent 
epidemiology. Because agents used for BW agents are live, naturally occurring 
organisms, understanding an agent’s pathogenicity, infectivity, incubation period, and 
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virulence in a natural environment is essential to understanding how that same agent 
would act if it were to be weaponized. As has been repeatedly emphasized, the public 
health community as well as the disease surveillance community is the first line of 
defense in a BW attack, as they must be the first to recognize and identify that a 
biological weapons event has, in fact, occurred.  
Additionally, as has been shown throughout this thesis, disease epidemiology is a 
critical component to microbial forensics. Without a thorough understanding of an agent, 
as well as the ability to collect sound microbial evidence from the “scene” of a BW event, 
the law enforcement community will not have strong enough evidence to prosecute those 
responsible for the event once the attack has been attributed. 
Therefore, epidemiology is a critical component of all three prongs of the 
attribution typology. Without, the identification, characterization, and attribution of a 
biological weapons event would be impossible. 
2. Deterrence from an International Perspective 
Equally as critical to an attribution typology is a thorough understanding of the 
international laws and the history surrounding current international treaties governing 
biological weapons events. As was noted above, BW attribution is a complex and 
transnational problem. Diseases, whether natural or unnatural, know no boundaries. The 
Sverdlovsk case study within this thesis depicted the challenges and complexity of an 
international BW incident. The lessons-learned of this event have been studied and 
published numerous times. Nearly twenty years passed between the release of anthrax in 
Sverdlovsk, and the attribution of the event. And, despite the scientific evidence that 
Western scientists possessed, the reason the Sverdlovsk event was finally officially 
attributed was simply because then President Yeltsin of Russia publicly admitted to the 
accidental release of anthrax from an old USSR military installation. 
The challenges of the attribution typology—identifying, characterizing, and 
attributing a disease outbreak—remain just as complex in the contemporary international 
environment as was true during in 1979 during the Sverdlovsk incident. U.S. 
policymakers must realize that BW investigation mechanisms are most supported by the 
international community when they can gain credibility before they are needed to be 
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used. The United States was unable to officially investigate the Sverdlovsk incident in 
1979, due to a lack of an agreed upon international BW investigative mechanism; and 
sadly, there remains no international BW investigative mechanism. As such, the 
weaknesses of the current Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC) must 
continue to be strengthened—both at the international level, as well as at the domestic 
level where the mandates of the treating need to be implemented into national legislation.  
If U.S. troops or allies abroad were to be attacked with biological weapons, it is 
very possible that the attribution of the event would be impossible. Without 
internationally agreed upon laws that allow BW investigation teams to quickly enter into 
a state’s sovereign territory, critical evidence of the attack will be lost, and so will the 
chances of attribution. 
As with most areas of international law, the precise manner in which such a 
policy should be implemented is and has been hotly debated, both at home and abroad. 
Despite differing perceptions of what type of policy would be best, the United States and 
all other members of the BTWC must make this issue a top priority. Without an agreed 
upon international framework for intra-state BW investigation, the identification and 
characterization of a BW event may be possible, but the attribution of the event will be 
unlikely. 
3. Deterrence from a Domestic U.S. Perspective 
Since the United States implemented the BTWC, fives presidents and nine 
administrations have sat in the White House. Undoubtedly, biological weapons 
proliferation and use has been a concern of each of these administrations. Despite these 
concerns, however, none of the administrations to date has successfully addressed or 
implemented an effective national biological weapons attribution policy. 
Two of the biggest impediments to a successful domestic BW attribution 
capability is simply lexicon and organizational zeitgeist. The domestic agencies involved 
in BW investigations—the public health and disease surveillance community, the 
forensics and law enforcement community, and the policy community—must 
synchronize to cohesively create not only an effective attribution policy, but also shared 
and agreed upon standard operating procedures for BW investigations. This capability 
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has been slowly evolving since 1996, but it must continue to evolve and advance. As the 
Amerithrax case study has shown, there remain significant hurdles and problems in 
national BW investigations. The lessons learned from the Amerithrax investigation, as 
well as older investigations like the Sverdlovsk incident, must be taken into consideration 
and corrected.  
C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Without an effective BW attribution policy, the United States remains extremely 
vulnerable to future BW attacks. It has been over five years since the Amerithrax attacks, 
and the perpetrator(s) of the attacks remain(s) unknown. This sobering fact not only 
makes Americans less safe, but it also sends a strong and negative message to any would-
be BW attackers. Future BW criminals see that, even in one of the strongest countries in 
the world, biological weapons remain the poor-man’s nuclear weapon. Just a small 
amount of expertise and capital is needed to induce wide-spread destruction—both in 
terms of potential lives lost, as well as economically. One FBI documents estimates that 
the ongoing Amerithrax investigation has already cost the U.S. government over $1 
billion in investigation and decontamination costs.229 The psychological impact on 
ordinary citizens of this reality is, of course, immeasurable.  
However, in addition to impeding any future BW investigation, the lack of a 
sound national and/or international BW attribution policy puts something even larger at 
stake: deterrence. Current and traditional approaches to U.S. defense and deterrence 
policies are based on the assumption that the perpetrator can be easily and reliably 
identified, and those planning or responsible for attacks will be punished. If perpetrators 
can conduct attacks without the fear or possibility of punishment, they can act with 
impunity. The ability to punish, therefore, rests on the ability to identify the perpetrator. 
Thus, attribution is at the root of all national security strategies of deterrence by 
punishment. 
                                                 
229 Allen Lengel, “Little Progress In FBI Probe of Anthrax Attacks,” Washington Post (September 21, 
2005). Accessed at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/09/15/AR2005091502456_pf.html, on 11 March 2007. 
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The notion that members of the current administration, as well as past 
administrations, view BW attribution as an intelligence issue whose goal is to collect 
enough intelligence to make an educated guess, using the reasonable man standard—
rather than a beyond a reasonable doubt standard or a probable cause standard—is a 
frightening thought. Although such a policy could be quite effective in the short-term, 
allowing policy makers to quickly respond to a domestic or international BW incident, it 
almost entirely defeats any long term deterrence goals.230  
 The United States has reserved the option of using nuclear weapons in response to 
a biological or chemical weapons attack. 231 This fact and this fact alone should be 
enough to convince policy makers that BW attribution cannot be thought of as simply an 
intelligence issue that requires the low threshold of a reasonable man standard; for as the 
United States has learned, intelligence is not a fail proof deterrence tool—and the 
international and domestic repercussions of such failure are tremendous. If the possibility 
of nuclear retaliation is to remain a viable deterrent option to BW use, the quick, 
efficient, and reliable attribution of BW use is an absolutely critical component to such a 
deterrence policy. 
Therefore, in order for the threat of BW use to be quelled and/or eventually 
defeated, the attribution problem is critical. Three main policy recommendations on 
biological weapons attribution can be taken away from this thesis:  
• (1) BW attribution is not just a technical problem. Policy-makers must work with 
scientists to improve the capabilities and understanding of forensic microbiology 
and epidemiology so investigations can more easily identify the capabilities of a 
given organism in the event of a BW attack. Additionally, a standing team of 
neutral, internationally chosen and agreed upon BW investigators must remain 
trained, equipped, and deployable. This team should have the capabilities to be  
 
 
                                                 
230 See footnotes 224 and 225 for further discussion. 
231 See Victor A. Utgoff, “Nuclear Weapons and the Deterrence of Biological and Chemical 
Weapons,” Henry L. Stimson Center Occasional Paper no. 36 (October 1997). Accessed at: 
http://www.stimson.org/wmd/pdf/utgoff.pdf on 11 March 2007. 
 109
deployed any where in the world in the event of a BW attack to collect the 
necessary epidemiological and forensic evidence needed to attribute a BW 
outbreak.  
• (2) The United States cannot solve the BW attribution problem if it acts in 
isolation. Disease—naturally occurring or deliberately released—knows no 
boundaries; the attribution of a biological weapons, therefore, is truly a 
transnational issue. The United States must comply with established 
international treaties and agreements in order to gain the credibility and trust 
necessary for coordinating international BW investigations.  
• (3) Domestically, U.S. policy makers must push for new laws and standard 
operating procedures in the event of a domestic BW attack. Many 
advancements have been made in the wake of the hard lessons learned during 
the Amerithrax outbreak, but a clear and coherent plan of action must be 
solidified into law, determining not only the hierarchy of which government 
agencies will be in charge of all the aspects of a BW investigation 
(investigation in general, evidence collection, sample testing, etc.), but there 
remains a need for inter-agency SOPs of evidence collection and testing. Any 
samples or evidence collected for a BW investigation must be of a high 
enough caliber that the evidence could withstand the scrutiny of the legal 
community’s standard of evidence. An ubiquitous and Congressionally-
approved standard of proof must be established for BW investigations and be 
adhered to by the policy, legal, and forensic communities to ensure not only 
the attribution of a BW attack, but also the ultimate prosecution of those 
responsible for the attack, and the deterrence of any future attacks. 
 
Without the fear of punishment and/or robust consequences, future BW users will 
remain undeterred. Though the unique characteristics of biological weapons make 
attributing who used or released them extremely difficult to determine at times, 
attribution is possible. With a firm understanding of the challenges of BW attribution, the 
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United States will be in better position to reliably attribute the source of a BW attack, and 
respond as specified in its national security and defense strategies.  
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